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SPECIALISED SOCIETY: DO TAX 
DISPUTES REQUIRE GREATER 
JUDICIAL SPECIALISATION? 
Sarah Miles* 
In recent years, a review of the Judicature Act 1908 and the introduction of the Judicature 
Modernisation Bill have enlivened the debate over the structure and character of the New Zealand 
court system. A key issue that the recent review and reforms have brought to the fore is whether 
greater judicial specialisation is advantageous at the High Court level. This article considers whether 
tax cases, in particular, warrant greater judicial specialisation. The article draws from experiences 
of specialised tax adjudication in foreign jurisdictions and evaluates the efficacy of existing 
specialisation in the New Zealand system, as well as considering whether the nature of tax law lends 
itself to specialisation. The conclusion is that greater judicial specialisation in respect of tax cases is 
undesirable.  
I INTRODUCTION 
Modern society is incredibly specialised. This reaches across most professions; doctors may 
specialise in microscopic facets of anatomy, engineers and manufacturers may exclusively produce 
tiny parts of machinery, and lawyers may solely practise in recondite areas of law. Within these 
professions, the advances and expertise that specialists achieve often mean that the benefits of 
specialisation are regarded as axiomatic. Yet, since its inception as a generalist bench, the New 
Zealand judiciary has remained resistant to this trend towards specialisation. It may be that this signals 
a failing of the judiciary to adapt, or perhaps judging simply remains an area in which the price of 
specialisation is more pronounced. It is often said that "taxes are the price we pay for a civilised 
  
*  Submitted as a part of the LLB(Hons) programme at Victoria University of Wellington. 
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society",1 but this article asks: what is the price that we pay for an increasingly specialised society, as 
regards judicial specialisation for New Zealand tax law cases?  
Across the New Zealand legal system, dissatisfaction with the ordinary courts has led to an 
increase in demand for specialist courts and judges. A survey by the New Zealand Bar Association 
indicated that 84 per cent of members supported judicial specialisation.2 Prominent members of the 
legal community have spoken out in favour of judicial specialisation,3 including Tony Molloy QC,4 
James Farmer QC5 and the Attorney-General Chris Finlayson.6 In response to the growing pressure 
for specialisation, the past few decades have seen an ad hoc and reactionary proliferation of tribunals 
and specialised adjudicators,7 reflecting a perception that decision making must be increasingly 
specialised to serve the interests of justice. Nonetheless, judicial specialisation has attracted 
opposition from a large number of judges,8 including Chief Justice Sian Elias.9 The Law 
Commission's comprehensive review of the Judicature Act 190810 and the introduction of the 
Judicature Modernisation Bill,11 which implements the Commission's recommendations, have 
reinvigorated the ongoing debate over judicial specialisation in the High Court. 
  
1  This quote is most often attributed to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr, as originating from his dissenting 
judgment in Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas v Collector of Internal Revenue 275 US 87 (1927) 
at 100.  
2  The New Zealand Bar Association "Submission to the Law Commission on the Review of the Judicature Act 
1908" as cited in Law Commission Review of the Judicature Act 1908: Towards a New Courts Act (NZLC 
R126, 2012) at 104. 
3  Phil Taylor "Justice in the Firing Line" The New Zealand Herald (online ed, Auckland, 5 May 2012). 
4  Tony Molloy "New Zealand: Cuckoos in the Nest in an Otherwise Promising Trust and Investment 
Jurisdiction" Offshore Investment (New Zealand, November 2009). 
5  James Farmer "The High Court in Review" (8 October 2012) James Farmer QC <www.jamesfarmerqc.co.nz>. 
6  Christopher Finlayson, Attorney–General of New Zealand "Access to Justice, Legal Representation and the 
Rule of Law" (speech to the Legal Research Foundation, 23 October 2009). 
7  Law Commission Striking the Balance (NZLC PP51, 2002) at 78–90; and Law Commission Tribunals in New 
Zealand (NZLC IP6, 2008) at appendix 1. 
8  Law Commission, above n 2, at 103. 
9  Rod Vaughan "Twitchy lawyers put heat under Chief Justice" The National Business Review (online ed, New 
Zealand, 23 August 2012); and Cabinet Social Policy Committee Paper "Government response to the Law 
Commission's report Review of the Judicature Act 1908: Towards a New Courts Act" (April 2013) at [16]. 
10  Law Commission, above n 2. 
11  Judicature Modernisation Bill 2013 (178–2). 
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Tax law is frequently singled out as a prime candidate for greater specialisation12 and judicial tax 
specialisation has developed in many foreign jurisdictions. The introduction of specialist judges, 
courts or panels stands to have a significant effect on the process and results of the court system. 
Accordingly, it is necessary to consider the merits of specialisation in a principled manner, particularly 
when the benefits of specialisation tend to be more readily apparent than its consequences.  
This article considers whether increased adjudicative tax specialisation is desirable in New 
Zealand, considering the "price" we pay for judicial specialisation, as well as its benefits. The article 
is divided into four parts. Part I considers judicial specialisation generally, observing the often 
unprincipled trend towards specialisation in New Zealand and warning against further specialisation 
in the absence of strong justification. Part II evaluates the level of judicial specialisation in New 
Zealand in respect of tax law, with particular reference to the position of the Taxation Review 
Authority. It concludes that problems with tax specialisation in New Zealand are best addressed by 
reform to existing means of specialisation rather than overlaying additional judicial specialisation. 
Part III surveys a selection of specialised overseas jurisdictions to gain insights into the realities of 
judicial specialisation and to establish whether New Zealand should follow suit. Lastly, Part IV 
applies Legomsky's set of normative criteria to determine whether the nature of tax law is suitable for 
greater judicial specialisation.13  
II SURVEYING SPECIALISATION IN NEW ZEALAND 
A "General" History of Specialisation 
Historically, New Zealand's court system has been characterised by a preference for generalist 
judges. More recently, there has been a growing trend towards specialisation, which is particularly 
evident in the growth of tribunals. 
New Zealand established its first court, the Supreme Court, in 1841 as a general court. The New 
Zealand court system indicated an early inclination towards judicial generalism, with a wide 
jurisdiction that streamlined common law and equity jurisdictions, and simplified procedural rules.14 
  
12  The Law Commission recommended the establishment of specialist panels in taxation, intellectual property, 
competition and admiralty law: Law Commission Delivering Justice for All: A Vision for New Zealand Courts 
and Tribunals (NZLC R85, 2004) at 267. 
13  SH Legomsky Specialized Justice – Courts, Administrative Tribunals and a Cross–National Theory of 
Specialization (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990) at 20–32. 
14  For instance, the Supreme Court Ordinance 1841 5 Vict 1 stated that the Court's jurisdiction incorporated 
testamentary, lunacy, vice-admiralty and criminal matters. See also Law Commission Review of the 
Judicature Act 1908: Towards a Consolidated Courts Act (NZLC IP29, 2012) at 110. 
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These generalist origins are attributable to the small size of the judiciary, which necessitated that a 
few judges covered a vast range of cases.15  
The advent of specialist courts happened gradually with the establishment of the predecessors to 
the modern Māori Land Court and Māori Appellate Court in 1865,16 the Employment Court in 189417 
and the Environment Court in 1953.18 The scattered introduction of these specialised courts indicates 
the absence of an underlying rationale or cohesive vision for the New Zealand court system.  
In 1968, New Zealand took a considerable leap towards judicial specialisation with the 
introduction of the Administrative Division of the High Court. The short-lived Division was abolished 
in 1991, following Law Commission recommendations.19 Amongst the reasons for the division's 
demise was a caseload that "lacked the critical mass needed for successful specialty"20 and the 
growing interest and expertise of High Court judges in public law as it became more common, 
obviating the need for specialist judges. 
 
 
 
  
  
15  GA Wood "Construction and Reform: The establishment of the New Zealand Supreme Court" (1968) 5 
VUWLR 1 at 3. 
16  First established in 1865 under the Native Lands Act 1865, s 5 as the Native Land Court. Now established in 
Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 (Maori Land Act 1993), ss 6 and 50. 
17  The Court can be traced to the Court of Arbitration established under the Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act 1894. It is now established under the Employment Relations Act 2000, s 187. 
18  The Court first existed as an Appeal Board under the Town and Country Planning Act 1953, then became a 
Planning Tribunal under the Town and Country Planning Act 1977. The Resource Management Amendment 
Act 1996, s 6 introduced the modern Environment Court. 
19  Law Commission The Structure of the Courts (NZLC R7, 1989). 
20  Law Commission Seeking Solutions: Options for Change to the New Zealand Court System (NZLC PP52, 
2002) at 157. 
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Figure 1: Specialisation in the New Zealand court hierarchy21 
More recently, there has been a proliferation of tribunals dealing with specialist matters.22 Once 
introduced, these tribunals have proved resistant to "overhaul and rationalisation".23 New Zealand 
still has well over 100 disparate tribunals, despite repeated attempts by the Law Commission to 
streamline the tribunal system.24 The Commission has remarked that the tribunals "have grown in an 
ad hoc and random fashion. They have been set up to meet specific needs, but not according to any 
rational pattern."25 
Specialist courts, too, have developed in an ad hoc manner, and it is often unclear why 
specialisation was considered necessary for particular areas of law over others.26 The creators of 
specialist courts often acted with little forethought as to the courts' operation as part of the general 
  
21  This diagram is reproduced from "Diagram of the Courts Structure" Courts of New Zealand 
<www.courtsofnz.govt.nz>. 
22  Law Commission Striking the Balance, above n 7, at 78–90; Law Commission Tribunals in New Zealand, 
above n 7, at Appendix 1; See also W John Hopkins "Order from Chaos? Tribunal Law Reform in New 
Zealand" (2009) 1 JIA Law TA 47. 
23  Law Commission Tribunals in New Zealand, above n 7, at 6. 
24  Trevor Daya–Winterbottom "Specialist Courts and Tribunals" (2004) 12 Waikato L Rev 21 at 22. 
25  Law Commission Tribunals in New Zealand, above n 7, at 6. 
26  Law Commission Striking the Balance, above n 7, at 50; See also the comments of Roger Kerr, who states: 
"I believe there are good arguments for abolishing most of them [existing specialist courts]": Roger Kerr 
"Judging the Judiciary" (paper presented to Wellington District Law Society Conference, Ruapehu, June 
1998) at 8. 
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court structure.27 Instead, the establishment of specialist courts was motivated by a response to an 
immediate and pragmatic need,28 or by a desire to privilege or influence decisions in a particular area. 
For instance, the Native Land Court was introduced to further the native land policies of the time by 
converting title more expeditiously than the ordinary courts. The Native Land Act's preamble 
expressed this purpose, without consideration of the principles behind specialisation or its 
consequences on the wider court system.29 Similarly, the first Arbitration Court (now the Employment 
Court) was established by William Reeves, who described the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration 
Act 1894 as his "pet measure".30 The Employment Court's history seems also to be borne out of a 
specific desire to introduce a specialisation without regard for the implications on the cohesion of the 
court system.  
Many commentators agree that specialisation is often primarily motivated by a desire to influence 
judicial processes and results. Baum observes:31 
Most often, proposals for specialized courts have been adopted because advocates and decision makers 
sought to shape the substance of judicial policy … The perceived virtues of specialization as such have 
played only a limited part in the adoption of particular proposals. 
Robertson agrees, concluding:32 
Specialist Courts are created when some interest group does not believe that equal application of the laws 
by judges applying the traditional canons of statutory interpretation and the traditional values of the 
common law will result in decisions that favour its own ideology and interests.  
Going forward, proposals for greater judicial specialisation must be critically considered to 
prevent deference to interest groups and to avoid opening a Pandora's Box of fragmented and unwieldy 
courts.  
B Means of Specialisation 
Specialisation may be internal, through the creation of divisions within the general court system, 
such as for the Youth Court and the Family Court, or it may be external, such as for the creation of 
  
27  The same cannot be said for the introduction of the Administrative Division, which followed the PALRC 
Report: Public and Administrative Law Reform Committee of New Zealand Appeals from Administrative 
Tribunals (First Report, 1968) [PALRC Report].  
28  Daya–Winterbottom, above n 24, at 24. 
29  The Native Lands Act 1865, preamble. 
30  Keith Sinclair William Pember Reeves: New Zealand Fabian (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1965) at 151. 
31  Lawrence Baum Specializing the Courts (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2011) at 214. 
32  Bernard Robertson "The Status and Jurisdiction of the New Zealand Employment Court" (paper presented to 
the New Zealand Business Roundtable, Wellington, August 1996). 
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the separate Environment Court.33 This distinction does not always reflect the degree of judicial 
separation of the particular court; Environment Court judges are also District Court judges, whereas 
Employment Court and Māori Land Court judges sit separately.34 Panel systems and specialist lists 
may also act as an inroad in to the judiciary's general nature. For instance, the commercial list in the 
High Court adds a greater degree of specialisation.35 Different means of specialisation strike a 
different balance between generalisation and specialisation.  
Specialisation can take place at any level of the judicial system. It is most likely to have the 
greatest impact at the High Court level,36 leaving appellate judges to benefit from the expertise of the 
judge who first pieced together the facts of the case in the lower court, when this expertise is often 
touted as the primary justification for specialisation.  
This article primarily contemplates a tax court or a tax panel. A specialist tax court would sit at 
High Court level and have exclusive jurisdiction to hear tax cases. A panel would be composed of 
High Court judges who have particular tax expertise. Tax cases would be allocated to judges on the 
panel and panel judges would continue to hear other High Court cases.  
III JUDICIAL SPECIALISATION IN RESPECT OF TAX LAW 
A What is Tax Law? 
It is necessary to demarcate what tax law is before considering whether it demands greater judicial 
specialisation. An inability to define a discrete area of law can stand as an initial obstacle to 
specialisation. For instance, Frankel has questioned whether commercial specialisation is appropriate, 
noting the overlap where "commercial law may involve contractual matters of either a generalist or a 
specialist nature (such as construction contracts), insolvency matters, tax issues, property matters 
[and] intellectual property matters".37 Tax law is less burdened by this problem than many other legal 
disciplines.38 Tax cases are easily identified through the presence of the Commissioner of Inland 
  
33  Susan Glazebrook "A Specialist Patent or Intellectual Property Court for New Zealand?" (2009) 12 JWIP 524 
at 525. 
34  Law Commission, above n 12, at 16.  
35  The commercial list was established in 1987. The list provides a pre–trial procedure for certain commercial 
cases, but returns cases to the High Court to be allocated to any High Court judge. Although the list was 
initially successful, nowadays only a small fraction of commercial cases is commenced by the commercial 
list: see generally Law Commission, above n 12, at 267–269. 
36  See S H Legomsky Specialized Justice – Courts, Administrative Tribunals and a Cross–National Theory of 
Specialization (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990) at 9. 
37  Susy Frankel "Facilitating and Regulating Commerce: Commentary on the Conference Session 'Regulating 
and Facilitating Commerce'" in David Carter and Matthew Palmer (eds) Roles and Perspectives in the Law: 
Essays in Honour of Sir Ivor Richardson (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2002) 391 at 394.  
38  But see the discussion of the Degree of Isolation of tax law in Part V(D) of this article.   
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Revenue (IRD) as a party. Tax cases typically deal with assessments of tax decisions or determinations 
of the Commissioner that are authorised by the various income taxation Acts. The simple 
identification of tax law means that it is less likely to be affected by jurisdictional conflicts, which can 
introduce second order litigation over which court ought to hear a particular case. 
B Current New Zealand Tax Judicial Specialisation 
Presently, there is no formal mechanism that provides for tax disputes to be dealt with by specialist 
judges in the general New Zealand court hierarchy. However, the disputes process and the Taxation 
Review Authority (TRA) give tax cases exposure to specialist practitioners and judges. Analysis of 
these forums reveals that the New Zealand tax system already incorporates a significant degree of 
specialisation in the valuable early stages of a tax dispute. While the process has some shortcomings, 
reforms to elements of the existing process are more likely to be effective than superimposing an extra 
layer of specialisation to the court system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: New Zealand tax disputes structure 
C Taxation Review Authority 
1 Overview of the TRA 
Taxation was possibly the first area of British law to develop a recognisable tribunal, with the 
establishment of a board of three commissioners under the 1799 Income Tax Act.39 New Zealand 
  
39  The Duties Upon Income Act 1799 (UK). See also Law Commission Tribunals in New Zealand, above n 7, 
at 13. 
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followed this model, establishing a Board of Review in 1891,40 although New Zealand has since 
adopted several different adjudicative bodies for tax disputes.41 The TRA provides an important initial 
opportunity for prospective litigants to have their cases heard by a specialist judge.  
The Taxation Review Authorities Act 1994 provides for the establishment of one or more 
Taxation Review Authorities.42 Technically, the Authority need not be a judge. Section 5(3) provides 
that an experienced lawyer of not less than seven years' practice may also act as the Authority. In 
practice, this has not occurred. Since 2012, a single District Court Judge, Judge AA Sinclair, has acted 
as the Authority.43  
The Governor-General appoints persons to the Authority on the recommendation of the Minister 
of Justice.44 The tenure of an appointment is for a term not exceeding seven years.45 Authorities may 
be reappointed, which has occurred frequently, with Judge Barber serving for some 31 years from 
1981–2012.46  
The TRA's judicial appointment process is different to the usual appointment of judges in New 
Zealand:47 the Governor-General appoints judges on the Attorney-General's advice.48 The divergence 
in appointment practice is troubling, because the ministerial involvement introduces a political 
dimension to judicial appointments. In view of the Government's substantial interest in the funding it 
receives from taxation, it seems inappropriate to give the Minister power over the appointment of a 
specialist Authority. The Law Commission has recommended the introduction of consistent 
appointment guidelines for tribunals, but suggested that the Minister of Justice, as a supposedly 
"disinterested party", be responsible for tribunal appointments.49 The Government did not implement 
the recommendation, but a 2014 Cabinet Paper proposed that the Ministry of Justice publish the 
  
40  Land and Income Assessment Act 1891, s 20. 
41  See generally, Law Commission Tribunals in New Zealand, above n 7, at 16. 
42 Taxation Review Authorities Act 1994, s 5. 
43  "Appointment of a Taxation Review Authority" (7 June 2012) 66 New Zealand Gazette 1820 at 1820. 
44  Taxation Review Authorities Act 1994, s 5(4). 
45  Taxation Review Authorities Act 1994, s 6(1). The Governor–General has the power to suspend or remove 
an Authority for engaging in an outside occupation, being unable to perform the functions of the office, 
becoming bankrupt, neglecting their duty, or for misconduct; Taxation Review Authorities Act 1994, s 6(3). 
46  See Appendix 2 for a table of previous Authorities. 
47  However, this position is not unique for a tribunal such as the Taxation Review Authority. Unlike the courts, 
many tribunals have different advising ministers.  
48  See generally Phillip A. Joseph "Appointment, Discipline and Removal of Judges in New Zealand" in HP Lee 
(ed) Judiciaries in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011). 
49  Law Commission Tribunal Reform (NZLC SP20, 2008) at 13.  
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tribunal appointment and reappointment process where it is common across tribunals.50 This proposal 
may boost the transparency of TRA appointments. 
The limited tenure of a judge is another inroad into judicial independence. It gives a member of 
the executive the power to appoint different judges after an arbitrary period if the Authority reaches 
decisions that conflict with governmental interests. Although the need for judicial independence is 
intensified in respect of tax law, granting lifetime tenure to Authorities is not without problems too. 
If a single judge was granted lifetime tenure and developed a track record favouring the 
Commissioner, many taxpayers would be left without recourse. The Courts and Tribunals 
Enhancements Cabinet Paper proposes to amend the appointment term of an Authority to a term not 
exceeding five years.51 Apart from Judge Sinclair's five-year appointment in 2012, a seven-year term 
has been standard for Authorities. This reduction may jeopardise the TRA's independence, which is 
particularly crucial in light of the relationship between the state and the taxpayer, or it may prevent 
long-term appropriation and damaged credibility of the Authority.  
The Authority is technically an administrative tribunal, but in practice, it acts like a court of first 
instance. Indeed, some foreign commentators have classified the Authority as a specialist tax court.52 
Under s 138P(1) of the Tax Administration Act 1994, the Authority is empowered to review 
assessments, including the power to confirm, cancel or vary an assessment, or to reduce the amount 
of an assessment. Taxpayers can generally file proceedings with the TRA or the High Court53 and 
there are powers to have the case transferred from the TRA to the High Court.54 Litigants usually 
have appeal rights to the High Court if the amount of tax involved exceeds $2,000 or the net loss 
exceeds $4,000.55 Appeal may be granted to the Court of Appeal in some circumstances.56 A 
specialist tax court at High Court level would remove any potential strategic advantage taxpayers have 
  
50  See Cabinet Social Policy Committee Courts and Tribunals Enhancements (24 June 2014) at 5–6. 
51  At 5. 
52  Suzette Chapple "Income Tax Dispute Resolution: Can We Learn From Other Jurisdictions" (1999) 2 JAT 
312 at 322. North P described the former Board of Review as a "judicial body" in Reckitt & Colman (New 
Zealand) Ltd v Taxation Board of Review [1966] NZLR 1032 (CA) at 1037. The Court of Appeal held that 
the Authority was a "court of inferior jurisdiction" for the purposes of s 67 of the Judicature Act in Jacobs v 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2012] NZCA 30, (2012) 25 NZTC 20-108. 
53  Carin Holmes and Kevin Holmes "Judicial System of New Zealand: Legal Remedies in the New Zealand Tax 
System" (2010) 16 Asia–Pacific Tax Bulletin 63 at 65. 
54  Tax Administration Act 1994, s 138N. 
55  Taxation Review Authorities Act 1994, s 26. 
56  Taxation Review Authorities Act 1994, ss 24(4), 26 and 28.  
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in choosing between the TRA and the High Court, which presents an initial argument for 
specialisation.57  
2 Declining cases: a failure of judicial specialisation? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Number of TRA decisions by year58 
The Authority has experienced a great decline in cases. A joint submission of the Law Society 
and the National Tax Committee of the New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants compares 
the 64 cases taken to the Authority in 1996 to the 13 cases that it had in 2006.59 A single Judge, for 
whom the Authority's cases take up approximately only a quarter of her time, now deals with the work 
performed by four judges for whom Authority work occupied 80 per cent of their time in 1996.60 The 
small claims jurisdiction of the Authority was removed in 2011,61 after having been used less than 10 
  
57  The Treasury identified this "tactical opportunity for taxpayers" as an issue in its discussion of a specialist tax 
court but did not find it persuasive: The Treasury Tax Review 2001 (Issues Paper, 2001) at 24. 
58  The number of tax cases is no longer collected by the Inland Revenue Department (IRD). These statistics are 
based on the number of cases reported in the New Zealand Tax Cases (NZTC). For a full table of the figures, 
see Appendix 1. 
59  The New Zealand Law Society and the New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants "Joint Submission to 
the Finance and Expenditure Committee on the Taxation (Tax Administration and Remedial Matters) Bill" at 
7–10 as cited in Andrew Maples "Resolving Small Tax Disputes in New Zealand – Is There A Better Way?" 
(2011) 6 JIA Law TA 96 at 98.  
60  However, Judge Barber notes there were really only two active Taxation Review judges, even when more 
district court judges held warrants for the Authority. Judge Barber commented that tax cases took up around 
80 per cent of his time in 1988, with the other 20 per cent dedicated to other criminal and civil court work: 
Ann Riley and others "International Conference Courts with Income Tax Jurisdiction: Conference Transcript" 
(1988) 8 Va Tax Rev 443 at 445.   
61  The small claims jurisdiction was removed by the Tax Administration and Remedial Matters Act 2011.  
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times since it was introduced.62 A decrease in sitting days also lends some empirical evidence to the 
deteriorating role of the Authority.63 As figure 3 demonstrates, the High Court still deals with the bulk 
of tax cases. The falling-off in cases to the Authority risks weakening the benefits of specialisation; 
without a steady stream of cases for judges to build expertise, the benefits of specialisation may wane. 
More critically, it may be that this decline signals a taxpayer preference to have cases heard before 
generalist judges. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Annual tax cases by court64 
However, it is not entirely fair to evaluate the TRA's effectiveness through a case volume 
comparison with the High Court. The High Court holds powers that the Authority does not, such as 
being vested with the sole power to hear judicial reviews and more extensive powers to award costs 
to the successful party (although this may be advantageous to some litigants).65 Another key 
difference is that TRA hearings are conducted privately and published anonymously.66 The High 
Court may also be the sensible route for taxpayers who expect to appeal their case further. The 
  
62  New Zealand Master Tax Guide (2013 ed, CCH New Zealand Limited, 2013) at 209. 
63  However, the small period for which sitting days were published and the significant effect that  a handful of 
complex cases can have in skewing this data means that its usefulness is reduced: see Appendix 3. 
64  The Inland Revenue Department no longer collects the number of tax cases. These statistics are based on the 
number of Authority decisions reported in the New Zealand Tax Cases (NZTC), and High Court cases on the 
Ministry of Justice's searchable database of Judicial Decisions Online. For a full table of the figures and 
explanation of the sources, see Appendix 5. 
65  Compare s 51G of the Judicature Act 1908 and pt 14 of the High Court Rules with ss 22 and 22B of the 
Taxation Review Authorities Act 1994.  
66  Taxation Review Authorities Act 1994, s 16(4); and Taxation Review Authorities Regulations 1998, reg 
36(2). 
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Treasury's 2001 Tax Review was reluctant to force commencement at the Authority because it would 
increase legal costs and lengthen queues, when "many cases currently being initiated at the High Court 
are likely to be appealed from the Authority if initiated there".67 Furthermore, institutional features of 
the courts, such as the time and cost of hearings which are not necessarily a direct reflection of success 
of specialisation, are suggested as being the dividing factors between the High Court and the 
Authority.68  
Compared to the large amounts of money at stake, the difference between the fees of the High 
Court and those of the TRA is insignificant,69 although the TRA may waive the filing fee where the 
disputant cannot pay the fee or the proceeding concerns a matter of genuine public interest that the 
taxpayer would not commence without the waiver.70 If the Authority cannot offer significantly less 
costly dispute resolution, then it is unlikely that High Court level specialisation would deliver this.  
Alternatively, the High Court may be preferred as a more expeditious avenue of dispute resolution. 
TRA decisions seem to take an excessive amount of time. The average age of cases, from Ministry 
receipt to TRA decision, is 828 days,71 excluding 16 adjourned cases that obscure the true average 
age. The Cabinet Paper outlining these figures makes special mention of the fact that the "tribunal 
considers very complex and litigious cases, often relating to large companies".72 However, 
information provided in August 2014 by the office of Hon Chester Borrows, Minister for Courts, 
indicated that work is underway to deliver prompter resolution of tax disputes. The office aims to 
halve the time taken to deal with matters across the court and tribunal system by 2017, including those 
matters at the TRA.73 The Ministry is delivering this goal on policy and operational levels. The 
  
67  The Treasury Tax Review 2001 (Final Report, October 2001) at [2.21]. 
68  For instance, see New Zealand Law Society and the New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants "Joint 
Submission to the Finance and Expenditure Committee on the Taxation (Tax Administration and Remedial 
Matters) Bill" at 7–10. 
69  The application fee to have a case heard by the Taxation Review Authority is $410: Taxation Review 
Authorities Regulations 1998, reg 10(1). The application fee to have a case heard by the High Court is $1,350 
and there are further hearing fees, depending on how many court days the matter takes: High Court Fees 
Regulations 2013, sch 1. 
70  Taxation Review Authorities Regulations 1998, reg 10A. 
71  Cabinet Social Policy Committee, above n 50, appendix 1. 
72  At 19.  
73  Email from Oliver Searle (Office of Chester Borrows, Minister for Courts) to Sarah Miles regarding Taxation 
Review Authority Enhancements (29 August 2014). 
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Minister is preparing the Courts and Tribunals Enhanced Services (CATES) Bill, which is expected 
to be released toward the end of 2014.74 Operationally, the TRA is:75   
… focusing in particular on older cases, ensuring the smarter management of tribunals support and judicial 
resources, and working alongside judicial officers to pro-actively manage cases towards a resolution and 
reduce the time it takes to release reserved judgments. 
This has produced encouraging results. Between 30 April 2013 and 24 August 2014, the average 
(mean) age of active cases at the Authority has decreased by 19.7 per cent, from taking 1,756 days to 
1,410 days.76 Additionally, the number of cases in hand has decreased by 66.8 per cent, from 157 
cases to 52.77 If the unpopularity of the judicially specialised Authority is due to excessive delays, 
then this progress signals that legislative and operational changes at the level of the Authority are 
effective solutions, without the need to specialise the general court system. It also suggests that the 
Authority's supposed failings are not as a result of its specialist nature or the problems associated with 
that, but more general operational issues. 
Indeed, beyond a quantitative assessment of the TRA, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions as to 
the qualitative success of tax specialisation in New Zealand based on the Authority's record of 
accomplishment. Sir Ivor Richardson concluded:78 
I have read hundreds of Taxation Review Authority judgments and numerous High Court judgments too. 
I hesitate to generalise or to attempt any kind of ranking. Certainly I have found numerous judgments in 
both jurisdictions to be very helpful in the depth of the analysis and reasoning. 
While some judges have performed commendably,79 the performance of others is open to 
criticism. Some commentators have observed that Authority decisions are rarely appealed or 
reversed,80 although in some cases this may be symptomatic of unduly brief judgments that do not 
provide scope to appeal. There have been some issues of inconsistency both within the Authority, and 
  
74  New Zealand Government "Further Improvements to Tribunals Announced" (press release, 24 June 2014). 
75  Email from Oliver Searle, above n 73. 
76  Email from Oliver Searle, above n 73. 
77  Email from Oliver Searle, above n 73. 
78  Ivor Richardson "Observations from the Bench" (address to the NZ Society of Accountants 1994 Tax 
Conference, November 1994). 
79  Hansard records praise in the House for the performance of the Authorities: "the role of the Taxation Review 
Authority… has been discharged manfully by officials and members of the authority for a number of years": 
(9 November 2004) 621 NZPD 16775. 
80  Paul Stephan "Courts with Income Tax Jurisdiction: An International Comparison" (1988) 8 Va Tax Rev 233 
at 242. See also Riley and others, above n 60, at 477. 
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between the Authority and the High Court.81 This could highlight the risk of leaving adjudication to 
a small pool of experts: poor decision making is more concentrated, and the quality and outcome of 
decisions is patchy and inconsistent, both intra-tribunally and inter-tribunally.  
Figure 2 demonstrates that the sharpest decline in cases before the Authority occurs after 1990, 
with cases peaking in 1984–1990. One explanation for this may be the appointment of less preferred 
judges to the Authority; with only one judge sitting as the Authority, it may seem likely that the 
Authority's caseload decline can be ascribed to litigants avoiding a particular judge. Yet, this 
conclusion is unsupported by caseload trends. The caseload decline in the early 1990s does not 
correspond with a personnel change; Judges Barber, Bathgate and Keane were authorities throughout 
both the peak and declining periods of the Authority.82 The drop also corresponds to an overall drop 
in tax cases across all the courts.83 More likely, the drop in cases corresponds with certain events in 
the history of taxation. For instance, the introduction of goods and services tax in 1986 introduced 
extra litigation, while a major reform of the disputes process and enactment of the self-assessment 
regime in 1994 and the settlements policy in 1995 reduced the number of cases proceeding to the 
Authority.84 Changes in the volume of tax cases before the Authority are more often brought about 
by changes to the law or reforms to the adjudication process. This underscores the need for a flexible 
and adaptable court system in the dynamic subject of tax law. Greater High Court-level specialisation 
risks damaging this flexibility by rigidly fixing the number of High Court judges able to hear cases. 
D Disputes 
Before a tax dispute arrives before a judge, it will have already passed through the disputes 
resolution process, which gives cases early exposure to a range of tax specialists to ensure that issues 
are identified and that factual disputes are addressed early in the challenge process.85 The Review 
  
81  See Susan Glazebrook "Revenue Law" (1993) 4 NZ Recent Law Review 180. See also David Dunbar's 
criticism of Judge Barber's decisions in certain income–splitting cases, even though it is acknowledged that 
Judge Barber "is an extremely experienced Taxation Review Authority with over 20 years' judicial 
experience": David Dunbar "Judicial Techniques for Controlling the New Zealand General Anti–Avoidance 
Rule: The Scheme and Purpose Approach, from Challenge Corporation to Peterson" (2006) 12 NZJTLP 324 
at 340. 
82  See Appendix 2 for a table of appointments to the Authority. 
83  William Young J tracks a similar decline in tax cases to the High Court in "Tax Disputes in New Zealand" 
(2009) 4 JATTA 1 at 8. 
84  Former Taxation Review Authority, Judge Barber, similarly observed how fluctuations in the nature of cases 
driven by legislative and policy changes can affect overall case volumes, commenting:  "I rather think that 
the claims by employees under the Fourth Schedule to the Income Tax Act 1976 have fallen off a little, as 
have farming loss cases, but as I mention below, the rental loss situation is a new problem area and there 
appears to be a greater proportion of investigation hearings than previously": Paul Barber "Tax and the Courts" 
(paper presented to the 1984 Residential Taxation Seminar, Wellington, November 1984) at 2. 
85  Holmes and Holmes, above n 53, at 64. The Review Unit also significantly limits the number of cases reaching 
the courts, with approximately one third of reviews in favour of the taxpayer: Zoë Prebble and John Prebble 
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Unit is an "independent"86 branch within the IRD, staffed by qualified accountants and lawyers.87 
The Disputes Review Unit delivers adjudication reports based on the papers, which help prospective 
litigants to determine their litigation risks according to specialist opinions. Key reviews and 
amendments to the disputes process in 2003 and 2010 have helped to achieve its objectives.88 The 
IRD has suggested that the decline in tax cases before the courts is evidence that the disputes process 
is functioning effectively and reducing the need for litigation.89 However, the disputes resolution 
process is not a complete substitute for litigation. Justice Glazebrook emphasises the important 
societal benefits that the disputes process lacks, observing: "Court judgments have precedential value 
and the court process itself can act as a check on executive power, something which is essential to the 
rule of law".90  
The decline in cases progressing to the Authority may suggest that the disputes process is too 
expensive or time consuming for many taxpayers, putting pressure on them to concede cases that 
might otherwise be upheld in court.91 Direct reforms to the disputes process best address this concern, 
rather than overlaying judicial specialisation. In 2011, the IRD made several changes to the disputes 
process aimed at improving its timeliness. The changes include an assurance of more focused notices 
  
"New Zealand" in Karen Brown (ed) A Comparative Look at Regulation of Corporate Tax Avoidance 
(Springer, Netherlands, 2012) 243 at 248. 
86  Glazebrook J notes: "While the Unit is a separate unit within the Office of the Chief Tax Counsel, it is still an 
internal administrative mechanism without the independence of the courts and without the public scrutiny of 
its decisions in terms of the open justice principle, which again is so fundamental to our system of justice (and 
indeed of parliamentary democracy generally)": Susan Glazebrook "Taxation Disputes in New Zealand" 
(paper presented to Australasian Tax Teachers Association (ATTA) Conference, Auckland, January 2013) at 
17. 
87  New Zealand Master Tax Guide, above n 62, at 222; "Office of the Chief Tax Counsel (OCTC): Disputes 
Review Unit" (9 July 2013) Inland Revenue Department <www.ird.govt.nz>. 
88  A review of the process described the objectives of the process as being "to improve the quality and timeliness 
of assessments and to reduce the likelihood and grounds for subsequent litigation": Inland Revenue 
Department and the Treasury Disputes: A Review – An Officials' Issues Paper (July 2010) at [1.4]; and Inland 
Revenue Department Resolving tax disputes: a Legislative Review (July 2003). Similarly, Commentary to the 
Taxation (Annual Rates, Venture Capital and Miscellaneous Provisions Bill) 2004 identifies that "the main 
objective of the disputes process is to have legislation and administrative practices which encourage disputes 
to be dealt with fairly, efficiently, and quickly before they get to court": as cited in James Coleman and Eugen 
Trombitas "Disputes with the IRD" (New Zealand Law Society Seminar, March 2009).  
89  Inland Revenue Department Resolving Tax Disputes: A Legislative Review (Policy Advice Division, July 
2003) at 2. 
90  Glazebrook, above n 86, at 17. 
91  Brendan Brown "New Zealand Case Law Developments" (paper presented to the New Zealand Institute of 
Chartered Accountants 2012 Tax Conference, October 2012). See also Mark Keating "New Zealand's Tax 
Dispute Procedure – Time for a Change" (2008) 14 NZJTLP 425; and Glazebrook, above n 86, at 11. 
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of proposed adjustments and clarification of the taxpayer's limited opportunity to opt out of the 
disputes process.92 IRD also set tighter internal deadlines and processes for monitoring deadlines.93  
E Settlements 
Settlement policies also explain the decline in cases to the Authority and High Court. Section 6A 
of the Tax Administration Act 1994 was introduced in 1995, allowing the Commissioner to settle for 
less than "the highest net revenue that is practicable within the law" in some circumstances.94 
Subsequent cases affirmed the Commissioner's power to settle disputes on a commercial basis.95 It is 
arguable that the case decline does not signal a failed application of judicial specialisation, but reflects 
changes to disputes and settlements practices. The shortcomings of these specialised stages of the 
process are best addressed, and are currently being addressed, by targeted reforms aimed at the 
particular delay or problem. High Court specialisation cannot be contemplated without reference to 
existing, specialised, stages of the tax disputes process.  
Overall, the TRA and disputes/settlements processes offer taxpayers an effective level of 
specialisation in New Zealand that would not be enhanced by the introduction of a specialist court or 
judges. Problems identified with the independence, cost and timeliness of these specialisations are not 
usually related to their specialisation per se, and are being addressed by a range of reforms led by the 
Minister for Courts, and internally at the IRD.  
F De Facto Specialisation  
As well as specialisation at the IRD and the TRA, there is arguably a de facto practice of 
specialisation on the New Zealand bench. Certainly, a small handful of judges have been instrumental 
in the development of New Zealand's tax law.96 Butler has observed an allocation pattern in tax cases 
  
92  Disputes Resolution Process Commenced by the Commissioner of Inland Revenue (Inland Revenue 
Department, SPS 11/05, November 2011) at [65]–[92] and [172]–[195]; and Disputes Resolution Process 
Commenced by a Taxpayer (Inland Revenue Department, SPS 11/06, November 2011) at [34]–[141] and 
[203]–[230]. 
93  Disputes Resolution Process Commenced by the Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 92, at [93]–[97]; 
and Disputes Resolution Process Commenced by a Taxpayer, above n 92, at [138]–[141]. 
94  See generally Mark Keating "Settlement of Tax Disputes: A Step Backwards" (paper presented to New 
Zealand Law Society Tax Conference 2011, September 2011) at 32–37. 
95  Auckland Gas Co Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1999] 2 NZLR 409 (CA) at 417; Attorney–General 
v Steelfort Engineering Co Ltd (1999) 1 NZCC 61,030 (CA) at 61,036. See also Care and Management of the 
Taxes Covered by the Inland Revenue Acts – Section 6 A(2) and (3) of the Tax Administration Act 1994 
(Inland Revenue Department, IS 10/07, 22 October 2010). 
96  For instance, McLeod claims: "It is generally accepted that Sir Ivor is a tax expert who has had more influence 
on tax law and practice than any other New Zealand Judge": Rob McLeod "Collecting Taxes" (2002) 33 
VUWLR 793 at 793. See also Geoff Harley "Reflections on Sir Ivor Richardson's Career in Tax Cases" (2002) 
8 NZJTLP 141. 
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between 1999 and 2001, noting, "Sir Ivor Richardson, Justice Blanchard, Justice Gault, and the High 
Court judges Justices McGechan, Robertson, and Salmon heard more tax law cases than their 
colleagues".97 There are dangers in relying on de facto specialisation; it lacks transparency, removes 
the benefits of organised professional development and prevents the introduction of safeguards against 
the perception of bias, isolation or idiosyncratic developments in the law. 
G Appointments 
More broadly, many newly appointed judges have backgrounds in commercial law, contrary to 
the perception that High Court judges disproportionately come from criminal law backgrounds.98 Of 
20 appointments from 1 July 2010, 14 were judges with experience in commercial law firms.99 Brown 
suggests that the appointment of Justice Glazebrook to the Supreme Court, who has considerable 
experience as a tax practitioner, is of "particular interest to tax practitioners".100 The appointment of 
more judges with a broad commercial background is a valuable way of equipping the judiciary to deal 
with tax cases, without many of the consequences associated with full models of specialisation. 
Although there is no legislative requirement that the Attorney-General consider the diversity of 
experience and backgrounds of candidates,101 this factor influences the appointments process 
protocol102 and practice.103 A specialist tax court or panel might make it simpler and more transparent 
  
97  Petra Butler "The Assignment of Cases to Judges" (2003) 1 NZJPIL 83 at 91. 
98  For instance, Roger Kerr comments that judges come from a narrow range of backgrounds, commenting that 
"there is a … potential source of judicial talent that is under–used because the system is clearly loaded against 
this group. A procedure of consulting senior judges inevitably favours the litigators who appear before them. 
Left largely out of account are the transactional or commercial lawyers who arguably undertake the real 
development of our law by devising original solutions to new problems": Roger Kerr "Judging the Judiciary" 
(paper presented to Wellington District Law Society Conference, Ruapehu, June 1998) at 5.  
99  Brown, above n 91, at 10. 
100  At 10. 
101  But see cl 94 of the Judicature Modernisation Bill 2013 (178-2), which requires the Attorney–General to 
publish information concerning judicial appointment processes.  
102  The Attorney–General has recognised that "legal ability", which includes a "sound knowledge of the law and 
experience of its application", is a criterion for High Court appointment. The Appointment Protocol recognises 
a broad range of legal experience and does not suggest any requirement for the Attorney–General to consider 
what a candidate would bring to the overall diversity of experience of the bench. However, the Attorney–
General does request a curriculum vitae with a full work history, including a list of significant cases the 
applicant has appeared in as counsel, as well as general career highlights: Christopher Finlayson "High Court 
Judges Appointment Protocol" (April 2013) Ministry of Justice <www.justice.govt.nz>. 
103  Former Attorney–General, Margaret Wilson stated from her experience that it was important, at least for the 
Supreme Court, to "reflect a diversity of legal experience": Margaret Wilson "Appointing Judges the New 
Zealand Way" (2013) 21 Wai L Rev 41 at 47. The Law Commission has also recognised the need to maintain 
a "horses for courses" approach to appointments when it formulated a set of general principles for the 
Attorney–General to consider in making appointments: Law Commission, above n 14, at 27.  
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to appoint judges based on tax-specific experience, but in light of the High Court's growing 
commercial strength, this benefit of specialisation is marginal.  
H Implications of a Commercial Panel 
The Judicature Modernisation Bill 2013 may have significant implications for the level of tax 
judicial specialisation in New Zealand. Clause 18 of the Bill establishes a commercial panel in the 
High Court, to replace the commercial list. Although the Bill does not set out the types of cases that 
the commercial panel will deal with, it is unlikely to deal with tax cases. The Bill abolishes the existing 
commercial list,104 suggesting that the cases that the commercial panel will determine are likely to 
remain the same as those dealt with by the commercial list. The commercial list does not incorporate 
the management of tax cases.  
Clause 18(2) of the Bill empowers the Chief High Court Judge, in consultation with the Attorney-
General and the Chief Justice, to establish other panels of High Court judges. There has been no 
suggestion that a High Court tax panel is imminent and the Law Commission was not satisfied that 
any other panels were justified.105 However, the existence of this significant power to create panels 
is a further reason that a considered debate regarding tax specialisation is crucial. In light of the ad 
hoc history of judicial specialisation in New Zealand and the divergent judicial views on 
specialisation, entrusting this power to a sole person may risk a proliferation of specialist panels at 
the High Court.  
IV THE OVERSEAS EXPERIENCE OF SPECIALISATION 
This Part will compare the approach of several foreign jurisdictions towards specialisation of the 
judiciary in respect of tax. Many of the jurisdictions compared in this section have dissimilar tax 
systems to New Zealand, and far larger federal court systems. Bearing in mind these limitations, the 
United States, Canada, and Australia have been chosen because they share a broad common law 
heritage and they demonstrate different models of specialisation. 
Most countries of a comparable size to New Zealand do not have judicial specialisation for tax 
matters in the general courts, although many have tax tribunals.106 This international consistency with 
similarly sized countries suggests that New Zealand's court system is striking the appropriate balance 
for tax judicial specialisation. Of the countries sampled that do incorporate specialisation into the 
general courts, such as Lebanon, Finland and Slovakia, most do not have dedicated tax specialisation, 
but administrative courts or divisions. Although New Zealand's now defunct Administrative Division 
  
104  The Bill does not carry forward s 24A of the Judicature Act 1908, which establishes the commercial list.  
105  Law Commission, above n 2, at 12. 
106  See Appendix 4. 
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only had a limited jurisdiction to hear certain sales tax cases,107 the division's collapse militates 
against a return to this system.  
A United States of America 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: United States tax disputes structure 
In 1924, the United States Congress created the Board of Tax Appeals, which evolved to what is 
now the Tax Court.108 The Tax Court has national jurisdiction to hear tax cases.109 The United States 
court system also features several specialised state courts that hear tax disputes in connection with 
state tax laws.110 The Office of Appeals is an independent body by which taxpayers may have their 
case reviewed before progressing to the Court.111 Appeals from the Tax Court go to the general United 
  
107  Legomsky, above n 36, at 56. 
108  The name was changed to the Tax Court in 1942 and was again changed to the United States Tax Court by 
the Tax Reform Act 1969 Pub L No 90-172 83 Stat 730 (1969). See generally Erwin Surrency History of the 
Federal Courts (Oceana Publications, New York, 1987) at 319–320. 
109  "About the Court" (25 May 2011) United States Tax Court < www.ustaxcourt.gov>.  
110  For example Oregon Tax Court, Hawaii Tax Appeal Court, Indiana Tax Court, Massachusetts Appellate Tax 
Board, Minnesota Tax Court, and New Jersey Tax Court. 
111  "Appeals… Resolving Tax Disputes" (16 June 2014) Internal Revenue Service <www.irs.gov>.  
 DO TAX DISPUTES REQUIRE GREATER JUDICIAL SPECIALISATION? 381 
 
 
States Court of Appeals in the circuit where the taxpayer resides. The taxpayer has the choice of 
having the case heard in the Tax Court, the District Court, or the Claims Court. The Tax Court is 
comprised of 19 presidentially appointed judges,112 alongside several senior judges and special trial 
judges.113  
An obvious strength of the Tax Court is the high degree of expertise of its judges. Baum notes 
that it is "regular practice" for judges to be chosen to serve on the Tax Court because of their pre-
existing expertise from specialising in tax law as a practitioner.114 The online biographies of Tax 
Court judges certainly support this claim.115 Baum argues that this expertise is likely to produce better 
decisions and he points to studies that observe a higher rate of Court of Appeal reversals coming from 
the District Court than the Tax Court.116 However, the strength of the United States' tax judiciary is 
largely a function of the size of the United States, rather than its approach to specialisation. The United 
States population and tax system are exponentially larger than New Zealand’s. In 2013, the United 
States Tax Court alone had 335 fulltime employees and total budgetary resources of $48 million.117 
Judge Barber notes that the key difference between the United States Tax Court and the TRA is size, 
stating: "We are a very small operation by comparison."118 The United States' population of some 
315 million people compared to New Zealand's 4.5 million suggests that the introduction of a 
specialist court or panel would probably have a marginal effect on the pool of judicial candidates, 
which will inevitably lack tax specialists in a small legal community. 
Despite the strength of the tax bench, the Tax Court has been criticised for its insularity and its 
lack of independence and transparency,119 suggesting that this criticism of specialist courts is almost 
unavoidable, regardless of how well executed or the scale of the specialisation. Specialisation, by 
nature, tends to be tarnished by these problems of appropriation and insularity, even though the extent 
of benefits from specialisation tends to vary proportionately to the scale of specialisation.  
  
112  Presidential nomination is subject to Senate confirmation.  
113  "About the Court" (25 May 2011) United States Tax Court <www.ustaxcourt.gov>. 
114  Lawrence Baum "Probing the Effects of Judicial Specialization" (2009) 58 Duke LJ 1667 at 1676. 
115  See "Judges" (11 April 2014) United States Tax Court <www.ustaxcourt.gov>. 
116  Baum, above n 31, at 153. 
117  Office of Management and Budget (US) (eds) Fiscal Year 2015 Appendix, Budget of the United States 
Government (Government Printing Office, 2014) at 40. 
118  Riley and others, above n 60, at 474. 
119  Leandra Lederman "Tax Appeal: A Proposal to Make the United States Tax Court More Judicial" (2008) 85 
Wash U L Rev 1195.  
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B Canada 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Canadian tax disputes structure 
Canada's introduction of a specialist tax court is more recent. The Tax Court of Canada was 
established in 1983 as a superior federal court of record,120 replacing the Tax Review Board.121 The 
Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to hear appeals or matters arising under certain statutes such 
as the Excise Tax Act and the Income Tax Act.122 The Governor in Council appoints judges.123 The 
Court currently consists of a Chief Justice, an Associate Chief Justice and 23 other judges.124 
  
120  Tax Court of Canada Act RSC 1985 c T-2, s 3. 
121  See Alban Garon and others "Tax Court of Canada: 20th Anniversary Symposium" (2005) 53 Can TJ 135 at 
137. 
122  Tax Court of Canada Act RSC 1985 c T-2, s 12. 
123  Section 4(2). 
124  "Judges" (10 June 2014) Tax Court of Canada <www.tcc–cci.gc.ca>. 
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The Court was established to fulfil the recommendations of a report by the Carter Commission, 
which criticised the independence and prestige of the former Tax Review Board.125 A specialist court 
was recommended to remove suggestions of political interference and to attract more skilled judges, 
who had begun to view the Tax Board as an inferior tribunal. The Tax Court's mission statement 
reflects a balancing between the dangers and advantages of judicial specialisation, affirming a 
commitment to "providing the public with an accessible and efficient appeal process and working 
together to maintain a fair and independent Court".126 By most accounts, the Tax Court is balancing 
these competing aims effectively. The Court's success is evident in the rejection of a 1997 proposal 
to consolidate the Federal Court and the Tax Court, with many stakeholders unprepared to surrender 
the efficiency that the specialised Court was providing.127 Overall, the Court receives glowing reports 
from most commentators, with MacGregor and others commenting: "The Court has garnered respect 
from both the general public and the tax community."128 
C Australia 
Australia has no specialist tax court, but incorporates specialisation at the Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal (AAT) and in a list and panel system at the Federal Court.  
  
125  Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation (Queen's Printer, 1967). 
126  Tax Court of Canada Tax Court of Canada, 1999–2000 Estimates, Report on Plans and Priorities (1999) at 
6.  
127  Ian MacGregor and others "The Development of the Tax Court of Canada: Status, Jurisdiction, and Stature" 
(2010) 58 Can TJ 87 at 97. 
128  At 98.  
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Figure 7: Australian tax disputes structure 
Taxpayers can take disputes to the AAT or the Small Taxation Claims Tribunal (STCT) within 
the AAT if the claim is for less than $5,000.129 Taxpayers may then appeal to the Federal Court to be 
heard by a single judge, with a further right of appeal to have the full Federal Court hear the case. The 
final opportunity for appeal is by special leave to the High Court. Interestingly, Australia does not 
have a sophisticated disputes process before the AAT as New Zealand has before the TRA. 
Commentators have questioned this gap and suggested that Australia ought to follow New Zealand's 
practice in this area.130 
The AAT was established in 1976, replacing the former Board of Review, which was a board with 
three members: a person from the tax office, an accountant and a lawyer. The Tribunal has been 
criticised for perpetuating a pro-administration leaning that developed from the Tax Office's influence 
in appointments to the Board of Review.131 Australia's experience reinforces the fact that specialist 
  
129  Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 24AC.  
130  Chapple, above n 52, at 322. 
131  Hugh Ault and Brian Arnold Comparative Income Taxation: A Structural Analysis (Kluwer Law 
International, 1997) at 19. See also Wayne Gumley "The Taxation Appeals System: An Administrative Law 
Perspective" in Chis Evans and Abe Greenbaum (eds) Tax Administration: Facing the Challenges of the 
Future (Prospect Media, St Leonards (NSW), 1998) 299 at 307–308: "The basis for this change was a 
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bodies often attract perceptions of bias, which can have devastating consequences for the reputation 
of the court or tribunal. This lends support to an argument for transferring the TRA appointment 
powers of the Minister of Justice (as advising minister) to an apolitical office, such as the Attorney-
General. Notwithstanding these suggestions of political influence, Downes J has praised the Taxation 
Appeals division for its strong membership, asserting that "the Tribunal … began its taxation 
jurisdiction with a distinguished group of taxation specialists. That position has continued throughout 
its 25 year history."132 However, if a much larger country such as Australia struggles to appoint judges 
whose experience in private firms or government departments does not give rise to perceptions of 
bias, then New Zealand is sure to struggle to improve on this experience.  
The Governor-General appoints members of the AAT as a President, Deputy President, Senior 
Member or Non-presidential Member. The necessary qualifications for appointment are dependent on 
the role.133 Currently, only 16 of the 84 tribunal members are judges.134 Extensive guidelines set out 
how the President of the Tribunal determines which members hear a particular case.135 The care taken 
in developing these guidelines hints at the sensitivity of panel appointments. If New Zealand were to 
develop a tax panel at the High Court, it ought to look to Australia's guidelines as a way of lessening 
the risk of "panel packing",136 which the Judicature Modernisation Bill leaves as a very real 
opportunity. The Bill gives the Chief High Court Judge power to decide the basis on which cases are 
to be distributed to panel judges,137 as well as the power to assign a judge directly to a case. 138 The 
result is that the Chief Judge could manipulate the allocation of judges to ensure that judges with 
certain policy leanings could hear particular cases, in an attempt to influence the case's decision. The 
guidelines provide general and special rules for constituting the tribunal and a list of matters to be 
taken into account generally, which reduces the arbitrariness of a single judge's choice in allocating a 
judge to a panel. 
  
perception by tax practitioners that the presence of former ATO employees as chairpersons undermined the 
independence of the Boards. A related argument was that the relatively small number of Board members 
(some of whom were also former ATO officers) created a risk that they would become attuned favourably to 
arguments regularly presented by ATO advocates before the Board."  
132  Garry Downes, President of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal "Twenty Five Years of Tax Cases in the 
AAT; Eleven years of the "practical business tax" (Corporate Tax Association 2011 GST Corporate Intensive, 
The Grace Hotel, Sydney, 17 October 2011).  
133  Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, s 7.  
134  "Who We Are" (9 September 2014) Administrative Appeals Tribunal <www.aat.gov.au>.  
135  Administrative Appeals Tribunal Guidelines "Guidelines for Constituting the Tribunal" (14 November 2011). 
136  See generally Butler, above n 97, at 85. 
137  Judicature Modernisation Bill 2013, cl 18(5).  
138  Clause 18(6). 
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Australia also incorporates a list and panel system for tax cases into the Federal Court. The tax 
list is geared towards facilitating case management. A tax list co-ordinating judge completes a pro 
forma questionnaire, leads a scheduling conference, and examines tax cases to ensure that like cases 
and issues are heard together.139 The Practice Note for the tax list provides that the co-ordinating 
judge will refer cases to the registry to be allocated to a docket judge. The individual docket system 
then provides for "cases in some areas of law requiring particular expertise (including patents, taxation 
and admiralty)" to be randomly allocated to members of a specialist panel.140 Spender J claims that 
the Federal Court's appellate decisions have "a certain authority" even though it is not a separate 
appeal court, because panels are "formed with specialist judges who tend to have an interest and 
expertise in one particular area of another".141 Typically, the Chief Justice assigns two tax experts 
and one non-expert to an appeal panel, to balance the expertise against a broad perspective.142 Overall, 
the AAT and the federal panels have been successful. Schabe and Blissenden praise the STCT as "a 
significant and worthwhile development in tax dispute resolution for which the Federal Government 
should be commended",143 and the panel system has attracted praise in both Australia and New 
Zealand, but has also been criticised as an elitist system that favours certain judges according to their 
area of interest and geographical location.144 Former Chief Justice Michael Black argues that the 
combination of the docket system and panels is optimal, asserting that:145 
In this way, the Federal Court maximises the efficient use of its judicial expertise at trial and on appeal. 
At the appellate level, the system provides a facility for constituting appellate benches for specialist cases 
that permanent courts of appeal are unlikely to be able to match consistently. 
Overall, foreign specialist tax courts and panels have successfully developed an experienced and 
knowledgeable bench, and an efficient system for tax dispute resolution. Yet, a recurrent criticism of 
these adjudicative and curial bodies questions their independence, and disapproves of their insularity. 
  
139  Federal Courts of Australia Fast Track (Practice Note CM 8, August 2011).  
140  "Individual Docket System" Federal Court of Australia <www.fedcourt.gov.au>. 
141  Jeffrey Ernest John Spender "Interview with J.E.J. Spender: An Overview of the Australian Federal Court 
System" (1990) 16 Brook J Intl L 453 at 458.  
142  At 458. 
143  David Schabe and Michael Blissenden "The Small Taxation Claims Tribunal: The Experience Thus Far" in 
Chis Evans and Abe Greenbaum (eds) Tax Administration: Facing the Challenges of the Future (Prospect 
Media, St Leonards (NSW), 1998) 283 at 283. 
144  In New Zealand, the Law Commission cited a submission of the Bar Association that referred to concerns 
over the perception of the tribunal as elitist, but stated that "the concerns that have been raised however do 
not detract from what is generally seen as the overall success of the regime": Law Commission, above n 2, at 
105. 
145  Michael E J Black "The Federal Court of Australia: The First 30 Years – A Survey On the Occasion of Two 
Anniversaries" (2007) 31 Melb U L Rev 1017 at 1043. 
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On the scale that these countries operate on, it may be that the price of specialisation is justifiable. 
But, for New Zealand, it is likely that concerns over insularity and perceived partiality would 
accompany specialisation, without the full benefits that these large, well-resourced, specialised tax 
systems enjoy.  
V NEW ZEALAND AND SPECIALISATION: APPLYING 
LEGOMSKY'S CRITERIA 
This Part will apply Legomsky's criteria146 to evaluate whether a class of cases should be 
determined by specialist judges. Legomsky proposed the 12 criteria as a method for determining 
whether specialisation is desirable, and applied the criteria to the former Administrative Division of 
the New Zealand High Court. The criteria provide a more principled way to consider specialisation 
than the responsive, ad hoc process that has characterised the history of judicial specialisation in New 
Zealand.147 
A Mix of Law, Fact and Discretion 
1 Discretion and the General Anti-Avoidance Rule 
The first criterion suggests that discretionary and factual decisions favour specialisation. 
Discretionary decisions lend themselves to specialisation because the wider the scope of a judge's 
choice, the more likely that the decision will best employ certain qualities possessed by specialist 
judges. These qualities include an understanding of the particular policy objectives, a reduced 
likelihood of oversights, a commitment to the pursuit of coherence, and reduced dependence on the 
views and adversarial skills of counsel.148  
Many areas of tax law are highly discretionary. Particularly, the application of general anti-
avoidance provisions involves a wide judicial discretion. Since the 1960s,149 litigation in respect of 
the General Anti-Avoidance Rule (GAAR) has been increased so that it now represents a significant 
component of tax challenges and litigation.150 Glazebrook J notes that many of the "most important" 
tax cases reaching the Supreme Court involve tax avoidance or evasion.151 GAAR cases also exert a 
  
146  Legomsky, above n 36, at 20–32. 
147  Legomsky's criteria are frequently adopted as the starting-point for analysing the desirability of specialisation. 
See Glazebrook, above n 33; and Daya–Winterbottom, above n 24. 
148  Legomsky, above n 36, at 22–23. 
149  Ben Nevis Forestry Ventures Ltd & Ors v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2009] NZSC 40, [2009] 2 NZLR 
358 at [11]. 
150  Mark Keating "Tax Avoidance in New Zealand: The Camel's Back that Refuses to Break!" (2011) 17 NZJTLP 
115; and Timothy McLeod "'Reconstruction' or 'Destruction'?: The Approach of the Commissioner and the 
Courts to Section GA 1" (2012) 18 NZJTLP 256 at 256–257. 
151  Glazebrook, above n 86, at 3.  
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significant economic impact. The "bank conduit" cases involved some of the largest sums in the 
history of New Zealand litigation, with an estimated $2.4 billion in tax and interest claimed by the 
IRD.152 
The GAAR provides that "a tax avoidance arrangement is void as against the Commissioner for 
income tax purposes".153 Section YA 1 defines a tax avoidance arrangement imprecisely and 
circularly, essentially declaring that a tax avoidance arrangement is an arrangement that avoids tax.154 
New Zealand courts have recognised the inescapable uncertainty of the provision155 and Inland 
Revenue's interpretation statement acknowledged that the courts are left to identify avoidance.156 The 
Supreme Court in Ben Nevis Forestry Ventures Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue formulated the 
most authoritative test: the parliamentary contemplation test.157 However, the test has been criticised 
for incorporating a "sniff test", allowing judges wide discretion to point to indicia of avoidance such 
as artificiality, contrivance, and mismatches between the form of an arrangement and its economic 
and commercial realities, which "contribute to the overall foul smell of a transaction".158 When tasked 
  
152  As Prebble puts into perspective, "NZ$2.4 billion is approximately the total of the annual fees of the New 
Zealand legal profession and rather more than the $US1.4 billion (about $NZ1.9 billion) at issue in the 
celebrated United States KPMG tax shelter cases of the late 1990s": John Prebble "Tax Avoidance, 
International Tax Arbitrage, and New Zealand as a Haven for Foreign Capital and Income" (2010) 16 Revue 
Juridique Polynesienne 169 at 171. See also Michael Littlewood "Tax Avoidance, the Rule of Law and the 
New Zealand Supreme Court" [2011] 1 NZ L Rev 35. 
153  Income Tax Act 2007, s BG 1. 
154  The tautology of the definition is reminiscent of Lord MacNaghten's remark that "[i]ncome tax, if I may be 
pardoned for saying so, is a tax on income" in Attorney General v London County Council [1901] AC 26 (HL) 
at 35. The very concept of income tax is to be understood according to ordinary concepts, as identified by 
judges. The statement illustrates that broad tax concepts are often resistant to capture by precise definitions 
and that judicial discretion is often necessary and advantageous.   
155  The Supreme Court stated that "it is simply not possible to meet the objectives of a general anti–avoidance 
provision by the use, for example, of precise definitions": Glenharrow Holdings Ltd v Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue [2008] NZSC 116, [2009] 2 NZLR 359 at [48]. 
156  The interpretation statement states: "the statutory definition of 'tax avoidance' is not an exhaustive one. 
Parliament has left it to the courts to identify tax avoidance, and the function of the statutory definition is to 
confirm that certain defined circumstances, such as future tax liabilities, are not excluded from the scope of 
tax avoidance": Tax Avoidance and the Interpretation of Sections BG 1 and GA 1 of the Income Tax Act 2007 
(Inland Revenue Department, IS 13/01, June 2013) at [14]. 
157  Ben Nevis Forestry Ventures Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2008] NZSC 115, [2009] 2 NZLR 289. 
The parliamentary contemplation test first considers whether the use made of a specific provision was within 
its intended scope, and then whether the use of the provision, viewed in the light of the arrangement as a 
whole, was nevertheless used in a way that was outside of Parliament's contemplation when enacting the 
provision. 
158  Mike Lennard "Two Tribes and an Elephant Called Ben Nevis" (2009) 22 Taxation Today 1; and Craig Elliffe 
and Jess Cameron "The Test for Tax Avoidance in New Zealand: A Judicial Sea Change" (2010) 16 NZBLQ 
440. 
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with navigating the incredibly wide discretion of GAAR cases, specialist judges with a keen "sense 
of smell" are needed to appreciate fully the underlying policy. With avoidance cases comprising a 
significant percentage of tax cases, and those cases having such profound consequences for the 
development of the law and the New Zealand economy, the level of discretion afforded to judges in 
this area is a strong factor in support of specialisation. 
Although the highly discretionary nature of tax law arguably provides strong support for 
specialisation, it can also exacerbate its dangers. A specialist court or panel concentrates the power to 
make substantial policy decisions, affecting thousands of taxpayers, in the hands of a small group of 
judges.  
Specialist judges are more likely to harbour dogmatic policy biases, which may have more severe 
consequences in highly discretionary areas of law. Constant exposure to similar cases can reinforce a 
judge's views on a legal issue, lessening their ability to bring a fresh mind to new cases. Where any 
policy biases are favourable to the Commissioner, there is a greater risk that taxpayers could perceive 
a bias in highly discretionary decisions. Compared to a panel system, an external court would heighten 
these concerns regarding bias and idiosyncratic development of the law because judges on an external 
court would not decide other non-tax related cases and would lack a wider exposure to other legal 
issues. 
2 Factual issues and expert evidence 
Avoidance cases (as well as other types of tax cases) often involve difficult factual questions that 
demand specialisation. North P declared that the presence of avoidance is "ultimately a question of 
fact".159 To decide whether an arrangement is economically and commercially realistic, judges must 
be able to analyse factually complex financial arrangements. 
Although specialist judges may cope best with the factual complexity of tax cases, they are 
particularly at risk of developing a narrow judicial perspective and pigeonholing certain fact situations 
that they are frequently exposed to. For instance, Sir Ivor Richardson has observed:160  
On the factual side, if you listen to a diet of asset accretion cases, I suspect it is easy to become cynical of 
standard explanations of discrepancies between expenditures on living and capital assets and reported 
incomes. 
Yet, in highly factual decisions, it is particularly important that a judge bring a fresh mind to the 
particular case.  
  
159  Elmiger v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1967] NZLR 161 (CA) at 178.  
160 Ivor Richardson "Observations from the Bench" (address to the NZ Society of Accountants 1994 Tax 
Conference, November 1994). 
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The extent to which expert evidence may alleviate factual difficulties is relevant. Judges have 
been somewhat hostile, perhaps justifiably,161 to the inclusion of expert evidence in tax cases. In 
Penny v Commissioner of Inland Revenue,162 the Commissioner disputed evidence on the basis that 
it related to questions of law, but for many tax issues, the boundary between law and fact is unclear. 
In the 2013 Court of Appeal avoidance case, Alesco v Commissioner of Inland Revenue,163 the Court 
acknowledged that expert evidence may assist the Court's understanding of factual context "where the 
impugned arrangement falls within a novel or sophisticated economic environment".164 Yet, the Court 
denied that expert evidence was necessary, stating that events at trial reflected "an increasing but 
unacceptable trend of resorting to experts to add to the armoury of advocacy".165 Overall, the factual 
problems associated with tax cases are exacerbated by a tendency of the judiciary to regard expert 
evidence as adversarial or simply "not particularly relevant".166 
B Technical Complexity and Cohesiveness 
Legomsky's second criterion convincingly favours specialisation; tax is extremely technically 
complex. Specialists are better equipped to deal with this complexity and to produce more sound 
judgments because of their dedicated familiarity with tax laws. Identified specialist judges are also 
able to receive more targeted professional development and tend to hold a greater commitment to 
educating themselves in the specialised area. Legomsky outlines four factors suggesting technical 
complexity: size of the relevant legislation; organisational complexity; existence of a specialised 
terminology; and fact-finding that requires extra-legal knowledge.167 
1 Size of the legislation 
The sheer volume of statutes,168 regulations, cases, rulings, interpretations and rules is massive, 
and increasing in volume and effect each year. The Income Tax Act 2007 alone is some 3,852 pages 
  
161  See generally Sir Ivor Richardson's discussion of the practical problems associated with expert economic 
evidence in "Economics and Law: The Courtroom Reality" (paper presented to New Zealand Law Society 
Seminar Economics and the Law: The Application of Economics in Legal Practice, Wellington, December 
1990). 
162  Penny v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2009] 3 NZLR 523 (HC) at [53]. 
163  Alesco New Zealand v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2013] NZCA 40, [2013] 2 NZLR 175. 
164  At [96]. 
165  At [97]. 
166  Andrew McSmith "Expert Accounting Evidence and New Zealand Tax Litigation: A Research Note" (2007) 
13(4) NZJTLP 565 at 582. 
167  Legomsky, above n 36, at 24–26. 
168  Legomsky, above n 36, at 24: "One view might be that technical complexity can arise from the sheer size of 
the pertinent legislation."   
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and is New Zealand's largest piece of legislation. This does not indicate drafting failures; the Rewrite 
Advisory Panel had remarkable success in redrafting the Income Tax Act to enhance simplicity and 
readability.169 Lengthy tax legislation is not unique to New Zealand. The inherent features of tax law 
mean that other countries have all needed to develop myriad laws and regulations to define and capture 
taxes. As Prebble observes, the complexities of tax law often arise because of features innate to any 
tax system: unavoidably arbitrary geographical distinctions, artificialities in income years, and an 
unprincipled capital/revenue distinction, are all intractable problems.170 Accordingly, the voluminous 
complexity of tax law is unlikely to decrease, and this is not only necessary but also usually desirable 
when other values of a tax system, such as fairness and certainty, are incompatible with simplicity.171 
2 Organisational complexity 
Tax law involves a high degree of organisational complexity. The Income Tax Act is the only 
legislation routinely not drafted by the Parliamentary Counsel Office. This is partly in recognition of 
its technical complexity.172 The legislation takes on a unique organisational structure, with 
alphanumeric numbering and functional organisation. Rapid, technical developments take place 
outside of legislation in tax information bulletins, determinations, interpretation guidelines and 
statements, operational statements, product and public rulings, and standard practice statements.  
In an increasingly global economy, the organisational complexity rises because of the addition of 
double tax treaties or provisions geared towards cross-border arrangements. It is likely that even more 
major conceptual developments will come in the next few decades because the complexity of tax law 
is inextricably linked to the rapidly changing international economy.  
  
169  Ivor Richardson "Simplicity in Legislative Drafting and Rewriting Tax Legislation" (2012) 43 VUWLR 517 
at 525–527; and Maryann Richardson and Adrian Sawyer "Complexity in the Expression of New Zealand's 
Tax Laws: An Empirical Analysis" (1997) 14 Aust Tax F 325 at 352–354. 
170  John Prebble "Why is tax law incomprehensible?" (1994) BTR 380–393; John Prebble "Can Income Tax Law 
be Simplified?" (1996) 2 NZJTLP 187; and John Prebble "Income Taxation: A Structure Built on Sand" 
(2002) 24 SLR 301.  
171  For instance, the United Kingdom Tax Law Rewrite Project Team has defended the complexity of tax 
legislation by pointing out that the complexity furthers the interests of fairness and is necessary to keep apace 
with economic developments: "The fact that we in the UK have some 6,000 pages of primary tax legislation 
is not a reflection of the prolixity of successive Parliamentary drafters, rather it reflects the choices the UK 
has made over more than 150 years to try to ensure the burden of taxation falls equitably in an increasingly 
complex and diverse world": Steve Matheson, Geoffrey Sellers, and Neil Munro "The Audience for Tax 
Legislation – Is It Different From That for Other Legislation and Should It Be Considered To Be the Same 
for All Sections or Parts?" (1997) 3 NZJTLP 178 at 181. 
172  But see Prebble and Prebble, who suggest that the drafting position simply arose "as a result of historical 
accident" because the IRD were undertaking redrafting at a time when the Parliamentary Counsel Office was 
under–resourced:  Prebble and Prebble, above n 85, at 244. 
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3 Specialised terminology and extra-legal knowledge 
Specialised terminology does not contribute to tax's complexity because most technical terms are 
obvious to a non-expert or explicable by counsel. However, the fact-finding endeavour of tax law 
often requires extra-legal knowledge from accounting or economics fields. Legislation often refers to 
accounting standards or practices, and an understanding of so-called "economic realities" is central to 
the application of the GAAR. More fundamentally, the lack of a basic definition of "income" has 
necessitated the incorporation of accounting and economic principles.173 
4 Drawbacks to technical expertise 
A mastery of the technical complexity of tax law may have drawbacks. The risk of judicial 
activism may be greater with specialist judges because specialists with expertise, through constant 
work in one field, tend to feel greater confidence in their judgment than their generalist 
counterparts.174 Judges are more inclined to making sweeping policy decisions, when they may not 
be best placed to anticipate the fiscal (or other) consequences without access to full parliamentary 
resources.  
5 A crisis of confidence? 
Although the complexity of tax law is relatively undoubted, the extent to which the New Zealand 
judiciary is capable of dealing with this complexity is contested. In a controversial article, Tony 
Molloy QC criticised the judiciary's institutional competence in dealing with complex cases, 
stating:175 
… the courts produce a plethora of judgments from which it is clear that counsel, or the judge—and 
frequently both counsel and the judge—have been trying to grapple with areas of the law beyond the level 
of their skill or experience.  
Molloy's comments in this article, along with a tirade of statements to the National Business 
Review, were widely criticised.176 Yet, Molloy's sentiments are not entirely isolated. High profile 
  
173  Ivor Richardson "The Impact and Influence of Accounting and Economic Principles on Taxation Law" (1998) 
4 NZJTLP 18; and Kevin Holmes "Should Accountants Determine How Much Tax We Pay?: International 
Accounting Standards vs. Taxable Income and Capital Gains" (Professorial Inaugural Lecture, Victoria 
University of Wellington, Wellington, 25 September 2007). 
174  Baum, above n 31, at 35. 
175  Molloy, above n 4, at 20. 
176  Molloy's comments included that "the public of New Zealand is being shafted by the manner in which the 
judiciary is being deployed", suggestions that judges were "flouting their oath", and that the justice system 
was "fraudulent" because of the lack of specialisation: Rod Vaughan "New Zealanders shafted by fraudulent 
justice system, says top QC" The National Business Review (online ed, New Zealand, 29 August 2012). 
Attorney–General Chris Finlayson condemned the comments as "a vulgar, crude and intemperate attack on 
our judicial system": Jock Anderson "Outraged Finlayson says judge–critic Tony Molloy should quit QC 
rank" The National Business Review (online ed, New Zealand, 31 August 2012). The National Standards 
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barrister Anthony Grant employed similarly strong language in claiming that "the age of the generalist 
has passed… [L]itigants know this and are reluctant to submit a dispute in a specialised area of law 
to a Judge who has no known competency in that area of law."177 
Statements such as these have contributed to what the Law Commission described as the 
"awkward question of whether there is a want of confidence in some High Court judges, particularly 
in the commercial law area".178 Criticisms of the judiciary's technical competence and the decline in 
tax cases support the idea that there is a crisis of confidence. However, the Law Commission has 
noted several objective measures of the quality of generalist High Court decisions. The Commission 
cited the numerous examples of overseas cases citing New Zealand judgments approvingly,179 and 
the 7,500 foreign trust registrations in New Zealand in October 2006–November 2012,180 as evidence 
that overseas institutions respected New Zealand as a jurisdiction for business affairs, contrary to the 
notion that confidence in the New Zealand jurisdiction is lacking. The report cited the collective 
submission of New Zealand judges, which remarks that "there does not seem to be any evidence that 
appeals from generalist judges are more likely to be overturned on appeal".181 It seems that the 
perception and anecdotal evidence of the competence of the judiciary, particularly as expressed by 
many lawyers, is not objectively supported.  
Although the views expressed by actors in the tax system vary widely, there is a perceptible 
division between judges and lawyers in the specialisation debate.182 It may be that tax lawyers, who 
often focus solely on tax law, are more inclined to rally for what they perceive to be improvements to 
the tax system that they exclusively deal with. Those who work wholly in tax law have interests in 
privileging the resolution of tax disputes over other cases, and have a particular interest in disputes 
being settled at court, rather than resolution by the disputes system. On the other hand, judges may be 
better positioned to holistically gauge the consequences of specialisation for the justice system overall. 
It is improper to dismiss the legitimacy of the insights that lawyers offer as being purely myopic or 
self-interested, but the interests of different stakeholders in the wider court system must be considered 
when referring to the specialisation debate.  
  
Committee of the Law Society ordered Molloy to pay $1,000: Notice of Determination by the National 
Standards Committee (NSC) (Determination 6446, December 2013). 
177  Anthony Grant "Courts – Is the High Court's Civil Jurisdiction in 'a Death Spiral' (Part 3)" Anthony Grant: 
Barrister <www.anthonygrant.com>. 
178  Law Commission, above n 2, at 113. 
179  At 113. 
180  At 114. 
181  At 103. 
182  At 103–106. 
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6 Cohesion 
A cohesive area of law containing substantial interrelationship can benefit from specialisation 
because specialist judges have a greater appreciation for the overall scheme of the law and can decide 
cases without creating unintended consequences for other cases within that branch of law. The 
complexity of tax law prevents its classification as "cohesive", which counts against specialisation. 
Specialisation may also impinge on the overall cohesion and accessibility of the court framework. 
Damage to the organisation of the court framework may create difficulties for litigants to determine 
where a claim lies and a panel within the High Court could internally fragment the Court. As a by-
product of this fragmentation, the valuable collegiality amongst High Court judges may be eroded, 
particularly if divisions are seen as elitist or insular.183 
C Dynamism 
The dynamism of tax law favours specialisation because specialist judges' commitment to 
following developments best enables them to keep apace of the law. 
Although tax law is subject to rapid changes, its existence as a primary area of law is long-
standing. Unlike the Administrative Division, which became redundant as High Court judges became 
more conversant with public law matters, tax law is already mainstreamed in the judicial 
consciousness.  
Tax law is dynamic for several reasons. First, it is an area that is aggressively tested by taxpayers, 
with Harley suggesting that:184   
… as taxpayers find new ways of acting just outside the boundary of what is taxable, so the government 
changes the definition of what is taxable to account for the new challenge. This is why there are so many 
Income Tax Amendment Acts each year and why tax law becomes so complicated. 
Taxpayers match each move by the Commissioner with an increasingly sophisticated 
arrangement, precipitating the enactment of more laws.185  
Tax law is exceptionally dynamic because of its political exposure. The 1993 New Zealand Law 
Conference discussed how "tax is the classic area in which the law and politics interact on a daily 
  
183  The New Zealand Bar Association "Submission to the Law Commission on the Review of the Judicature Act 
1908" as cited in Law Commission, above n 2, at 105. 
184  Geoff Harley "Tax and Law" [2002] NZLJ 305 at 305. 
185  See also James R Hines Jr "On the Timeliness of Tax Reform" (2004) 88 Journal of Public Economics 1043.   
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basis".186 Political parties campaign on tax reform proposals and the tax system is subject to frequent 
reforms in service of political agendas.187  
Sir Ivor Richardson attributed the dynamism of tax law to the economic and social objectives it 
serves, concluding that "there is no other area of our law which is so subject to constant review and 
change".188 As well as substantive changes to the law, attitudes towards taxation and compliance can 
shift and alter the volume of cases. The former President of the Australian Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal noted that "fashions in tax avoidance" could cause significant fluctuations in the volume of 
cases coming before the courts.189  
Any specialisation would need to be flexible enough to withstand a changing caseload, according 
to political, policy and compliance changes. Tax panels are preferable to independent courts, because 
they cope better with fluctuating caseloads by having judges sit on other cases when there is reduced 
demand for tax litigation. Ultimately, generalist courts would allow for the greatest flexibility. 
D Degree of Isolation 
The degree of isolation of an area of law is a double-edged sword, at times favouring specialisation 
and at others favouring generalism. Legomsky identifies discreteness and uniqueness as the properties 
of isolation.  
Tax law is discrete, even though cases often involve issues that are equally classifiable as, inter 
alia, company law, property law, or criminal law. The discreteness of tax can be narrowing the 
perspectives of specialist judges. French J has spoken out against specialist courts stating that:190 
One of the great strengths of the law is the facility it offers to cross-fertilise concepts and approaches from 
one area to another. Specialisation leads to intellectual inbreeding and risks the development of 
excessively comfortable relationships between judges and members of the relevant specialist bar.  
Perhaps the scarce evidence of the cross-fertilisation of other legal concepts into tax law signals 
that it is already isolated and parochial, when this should not necessarily be the case. It may be that 
  
186  Ivor Richardson and others "Tax Law: How Can the System Generate the Cash Needs of Government, and 
Still be Fair to the Ordinary Taxpayer?"(panel discussion at the 1993 New Zealand Law Conference, 
Wellington, March 1993) at 200. 
187  Sawyer claims that "tax policy and politics go hand in hand" and observes that the influence of consultation 
in the generic tax policy process pales in comparison to the will of politicians in tax policy formulation: Adrian 
Sawyer "Reviewing Tax Policy Development in New Zealand: Lessons from a Delicate Balancing of 'Law 
and Politics' (2013) 28 ATF 401 at 402. See also Paul Goldsmith We Won, You Lost, Eat That!: A Political 
History of Tax in New Zealand Since 1840 (David Ling Publishing Limited, 2008). 
188  Ivor Richardson "Appellate Court Responsibilities and Tax Avoidance" (1985) 2 ATF 3 at 3. 
189  Downes, above n 132. 
190  Jeremy Curthoys "In Conversation with Justice Robert French" (2002) 50 IPF 6 at 8. 
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the lack of connections with other areas of law is not due to the nature of tax law, but is because of an 
already blinkered perspective of tax practitioners or judges. Caron suggests that the misperception 
that tax law is a self-contained body of law has "impaired the development of tax law by ignoring 
insights from other areas of law that should inform the tax debate".191 In the Australian context, 
Gordon J has remarked: "Another effect of specialisation and myopia in the tax profession is the 
inability, failure or refusal to embrace the particular facts of a problem."192 Gordon J pointed to 
Aid/Watch Incorporated v Commissioner of Taxation,193 as an example of a case with a pronounced 
need to think "outside of the tax sphere"194 and look to the general law of charities to determine 
whether the political activities of a taxpayer institution defeated its charitable characterisation, despite 
the case's classification as a tax case.195 The New Zealand Supreme Court did not characterise the 
materially similar case of Re Greenpeace of New Zealand Incorporated196 as a tax case,197 
demonstrating the artificiality of sectioning off an area of law. Judge Barber commented that in cases 
before the TRA, "all sorts of legal problems only indirectly related to the tax situation arise", such as 
commercial, trust, or criminal issues.198 In the many cases that are not strictly tax-specific, a specialist 
tax judge is no better equipped than a generalist is. 
Tax law may be described as unique because analogies are unlikely to be drawn with the resolution 
or reasoning of cases in other fields. Tax law is primarily statute based, and it has developed unique 
processes of statutory interpretation,199 where orthodox, traditional methods of interpretation have 
  
191  Paul Caron "Tax Myopia, Or Mamas Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up To Be Tax Lawyers" (1994) 13 Va Tax 
Rev 517 at 518. 
192  Michelle Gordon "Tax Is More Than Numbers – But It Is Also More Than Tax: The Interrelationship between 
Tax Law and Other Areas Of Law, and The Consequences On Teaching, Drafting and Interpreting Tax Laws" 
(speech to the 23rd Australasian Tax Teachers Association Conference, Melbourne, January 2011) at 2.  
193  Aid/Watch Inc v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2010] HCA 42, (2010) 241 CLR 539. 
194  Gordon, above n 192, at 2. 
195  The case was brought against the Commissioner and classified as a tax case, even though "the dispute [was] 
occasioned not by the terms of the revenue legislation … but by the content of the general law respecting 
charitable purposes": Aid/Watch Inc v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, above n 193, at [27]. 
196  Re Greenpeace of New Zealand Incorporated [2014] NZSC 105, [2015] 1 NZLR 169. 
197  In New Zealand, the case was not referred to by the Supreme Court as a tax case, even though the Court 
acknowledged that the principal advantage of charitable registration is tax relief: at [1]. 
198  Barber, above n 84, at 2. 
199  See generally Eugen Trombitas "Statutory Interpretation and Tax Avoidance" [2010] NZLJ 428. 
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been inappropriate.200 However, unique approaches to statutory interpretation have been criticised by 
the likes of Kirby J, who stated:201   
It is hubris … to consider that "their Act" is special and distinct from general movements in statutory 
construction which have been such a marked feature of our legal system. 
Again, it may be that tax law itself is not isolated, but practitioners of tax law hold it in isolation.  
Whatever the causes of the isolation, it gives rise to an insensitivity of generalist judges to tax 
implications of their judgments, whereby a judge's decision in an ostensibly unrelated case can have 
a ripple effect on tax law. Isolating tax law further by removing it from the general court system or 
from other generalist judges, heightens this risk.  
E Repetition 
Areas of law involving a high degree of repetition are more likely to warrant specialisation 
because they can maximise efficiency. Rather than requiring many judges to become familiar with a 
repetitive case model, specialisation targets the initial education at a smaller pool of judges. Repetitive 
cases intensify the need for consistency within an area of law, and consistency is best served by 
judicial specialisation because specialisation brings familiarity and exposes a case to fewer conflicting 
adjudicators.202  
The presence of repetitive cases may pose problems for judicial recruitment, when the role attracts 
many judges because of the diversity it offers. It is difficult to predict whether tax judicial 
specialisation would improve or impair recruitment. The wide range of work of generalist judges may 
be attractive to potential judges.203 Perhaps it would even come as a relief to many candidates to know 
they would not hear tax cases.204 On the other hand, an opportunity to delve further into specialisation 
is appealing to judges with a strong interest in that area. 
  
200  For instance, because the Income Tax Act's purposes expressly include the purpose of imposing tax, a purely 
purposive approach may often be inappropriately stacked in favour of the Commissioner because the 
interpretation that prevails would be the interpretation that imposes the most tax. See: Income Tax Act 2007, 
s AA1(a); and Commissioner of Inland Revenue v International Importing Ltd [1972] NZLR 1095 (CA). 
201  Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Ryan (2000) 201 CLR 109 at [84]. See also Michael Kirby "Hubris 
Contained: Why a Separate Australian Tax Court Should Be Rejected" (speech to the 23rd Challis Taxation 
Discussion Group, Sydney, 3 August 2007). 
202  Legomsky, above n 36, at 27. 
203  Law Commission, above n 2, at 103. 
204  Former Taxation Review Authority, Judge Barber, attributed the backlog of tax cases in the High Court in the 
mid–1980s to the fact that "if you speak to any of the High Court Judges, they will tell you that they don't 
much like handling tax cases": Riley and others, above n 60, at 475. 
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However, although avoidance cases dominate substantive tax litigation, the remaining cases often 
sprawl a range of technical or procedural issues,205 undermining the characterisation of tax law as an 
overly repetitive branch of law. Even within avoidance cases, there is minimal repetition and different 
arrangements require separate factual examination.  
F Clannishness 
The clannishness of lawyers, government officials and experts within the tax field also favours 
generalism. Most law firms have a dedicated tax team and lawyers rarely move in and out of a tax 
specialisation because of the significant time taken to build expertise. This clannishness can increase 
the chances of perceptions of bias because of the familiarity of adjudicators and other actors in the 
system.  
The tax community's clannishness may also give rise to a greater risk of complacency and a 
reduction in innovative jurisprudence because of the minimal exposure to outside judicial thinking. A 
fresh perspective is necessary to question assumptions or settled modes of judicial thinking. New 
Zealand's comparatively small legal population makes clannishness more troubling. From the outset, 
a handful of law professors will teach most New Zealand tax lawyers, who then progress through the 
insular tax community, attending tax-specific conferences, undergoing professional development and 
networking. There is a self-selection bias before law students even commence their education, with 
Caron stating: "Tax courses are perceived to be reserved for…'tax geeks' – accountant-types who 
carry calculators and plastic pocket-protectors for their multi-color array of pens."206 Specialist judges 
are likely to come from this small, closed tax community and may consequently develop a narrow 
judicial perspective.  
Another consequence of clannishness is an exposure to manipulation. Glazebrook J suggests: "A 
major risk of specialization is that judicial objectivity may be lost due to actors in the sphere becoming 
too familiar, and judges thus becoming vulnerable to interest group manipulation."207 Interest groups 
need not spread their efforts across a general bench in the hopes of influencing decision making. This 
leaves few tax judges more susceptible to capture or pressure by interested parties.  
Greater tax judiciary specialisation may also damage the representativeness of the bench because 
the profession often lacks diversity.208 Worldwide, there is a concentration of men in the tax 
  
205  Judge Barber has commented on the broad range of cases that came before the Taxation Review Authority, 
stating: "Even from the general description of cases noted in the memorandum, it can be seen that the type–
coverage is quite extensive and all sorts of legal problems only indirectly related to the tax situation arise":  
Barber, above n 84, at 2. 
206  Caron, above n 191, at 519. 
207  Glazebrook, above n 33, at 538. 
208  The record of appointments to the Taxation Review Authority reinforces the existence of this problem, with 
only one female tax judge in the history of the Authority. 
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profession,209 which risks exacerbating the unsatisfactory gender diversity of the judiciary.210 New 
Zealand is unexceptional; lawyers who spend over 50 per cent of their time on tax law fall in a 39:61 
female to male ratio.211 Indeed, there is a question of whether the small tax community would provide 
an adequate (let alone diverse) pool of judicial candidates. Judging is, in itself, a legal 
specialisation,212 with only a small number of lawyers possessing the necessary qualifications and 
attributes. Limiting the potential pool to a single area of law may prove difficult in terms of 
recruitment. 
Despite tax law's clannishness, there have been few applications for recusal for judges of the 
Taxation Review Authority, perhaps suggesting that arguments relying on perceptions of bias are 
overstated, since the existence of a single tax adjudicator has not translated to a significant number of 
recusal applications. Mr John Russell made the only recusal application to an Authority, Judge Barber, 
who refused.213 Mr Russell alleged that Judge Barber was biased because he had consistently held 
against Mr Russell in 65 cases between 1989 and 2005, 214 which involved the "Russell Template", a 
tax template that Mr Russell designed. Mr Russell argued that Judge Barber had "formed very firm 
views concerning the template".215 It was unnecessary to decide at the High Court or Court of Appeal 
whether there was apparent bias because Wylie J reheard the substantive case at the High Court and 
there was no suggestion that he was biased. Although this case represents an isolated event of recusal 
application, it demonstrates how the risk of apparent bias can flow from a single specialised judge 
forming fixed views as a result of hearing the same types of cases. 
  
209  Ulrike Shultz and Gisela Shaw Comparative Sociology of Women Lawyers: The "Feminization" of the Legal 
Profession (Hart Publishing, Oregon, 2003) at 346.  
210  Law Commission, above n 14, at 27. See also Susan Glazebrook "Looking Through the Glass: Gender 
Inequality at the Senior Levels of New Zealand's Legal Profession" (speech to the annual "Chapman Tripp – 
Women in Law" event, Wellington, 16 September 2010).  
211  New Zealand Law Society/Momentum Legal Salary Survey 2011 (2011) at 16. The only areas of law where 
men featured more dominantly than in tax were lending activities, arbitration, banking and finance, 
company/commercial, civil litigation, immigration and property. 
212  Law Commission, above n 2, at 103. 
213  Russell v Commissioner of Inland Revenue TRA 003/03 Decision No 10/2005, 27 July 2005. 
214  The Taxation Review Authority heard 82 cases related to Mr Russell since 1989. Sixty five of those cases 
were heard by Judge Barber: Russell v Taxation Review Authority (2009) 24 NZTC 23,284 (HC) at [1]. 
215  Russell v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 213, at [9]. 
400 (2015) 46 VUWLR 
G Peculiar Importance of Consistency 
Legomsky argues that specialisation helps ensure the law's internal consistency. This is important 
in relation to tax law because fairness is an essential aim of the income tax system;216 taxpayers who 
are similarly placed should be taxed consistently. Compliance is often dependent on perceptions of 
fairness.217 
Recently, tax avoidance has begun to attract the wider public's attention, with increased political 
and media coverage. The IRD's report on the taxation of multinational companies noted: "Media 
comment around the world has focused on the unfairness of the low levels of tax paid by some 
multinationals",218 which suggests that the adjudication of tax disputes may already be perceived to 
favour large multinational parties.  
Taxpayers are often indirectly in competition, heightening the need for consistent decision making 
to avoid unfair tax advantages for some taxpayers over their competitors. Where competing taxpayers 
structure their affairs identically, decisions must be consistent between taxpayers. 
In a small country like New Zealand, the difference between specialist and generalist adjudicators 
may be minimal. In commenting on the decisions coming from the TRA, Harley suggested that there 
is "bound to be inconsistency" with five Authorities deciding cases with similar issues, but that the 
inconsistency is no greater than for some 24 to 26 High Court judges at the Court of Appeal.219 If a 
mere five Authorities is enough to create inconsistency in the law, then a tax panel is unlikely to 
remedy this problem. 
H Degree of Controversy 
Legomsky argues that controversial subject-matter favours generalism because controversy 
heightens the problems associated with concentrated judicial power and the risk of apparent bias. The 
controversy of tax judgments arises for several reasons.  
First, the large amount of money involved and the far-reaching consequences of tax law mean that 
decisions are of considerable public interest. Sir Ivor Richardson affirms the significance of tax law, 
  
216  Victoria University of Wellington Tax Working Group A Tax System for New Zealand's Future (Victoria 
University of Wellington Centre for Accounting, Governance and Taxation Research, January 2010) at 9–10.  
217  Natrah Saad "Fairness Perceptions and Compliance Behaviour: The New Zealand Evidence" (2011) 17 
NZJTLP 33. 
218  Inland Revenue Department Taxation of Multinational Companies (Tax Policy Report, T2012/3250; 
PAD2012/268, December 2012) at 10. 
219  Geoff Harley "Tax Law: How Can the System Generate the Cash Needs of Government, and Still be Fair to 
the Ordinary Taxpayer?" (panel discussion at the 1993 New Zealand Law Conference, Wellington, March 
1993) at 200 at 209. 
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asserting: "There is no other legislation which is so far reaching and pervasive and which touches 
human activities at so many points."220 
Highly discretionary decisions, such as those in anti-avoidance cases, tend to be the most 
controversial because the risk of policy-making or judicial activism tends to be the most clearly 
exhibited in this context. On the topic of tax avoidance, Keating asks:221 
What is it about tax avoidance that causes so much controversy? No other single provision of the Income 
Tax Act is so commonly litigated. No other aspect of tax generates as much heated debate in both tax 
practice and academic circles.  
Tax cases also create a high degree of controversy because litigation is effectively between the 
individual and the government,222 with the result that the resolution of tax cases is of significant public 
importance. McKay suggests that taxation is a fundamental element of the relationship between the 
state and the citizen, arguing:223 
Such is the impact of taxation, so vital is it to the character, the quality, of both our day-to-day lives as 
individuals, and the overall social face of our society, that it seems to me to be a matter of constitutional 
significance. 
The government's interest in taxation is immense, with over $53.8 billion collected in the 
2012/2013 tax year.224 The Commissioner also arguably benefits from a power imbalance in 
litigation,225 having access to the full resources of the state. This intensifies the need for public justice 
in tax cases and suggests that an ordinary court of record ought to hear cases because it is more likely 
to be open, accessible and transparent to most citizens. Constitutionally, the judiciary is one of the 
few, limited checks on Parliament's otherwise unrestrained power to impose tax. Sir Ivor Richardson 
has noted that over time the judiciary has adopted a less protective role in respect of individual 
  
220  Richardson, above n 188, at 3. 
221  Keating, above n 150, at 115.  
222  The Solicitor–General, in his or her capacity as Chief Executive of the Crown Law Office, is ultimately 
responsible for the representation of the Commissioner of Inland Revenue in litigation: see generally 
"Protocols Between the Solicitor–General And Commissioner of Inland Revenue" (29 July 2009) Inland 
Revenue <www.ird.govt.nz>. 
223  Lindsay McKay "Taxation and the Constitution" (1985) 15 VUWLR 53 at 58. 
224  Inland Revenue Annual Report 2013 (Wellington) 2013 at 7. 
225  It has been argued in the Australian context that individual taxpayers in particular can suffer from an 
unfavourable imbalance in power: Binh Tran–Nam and Michael Walpole "Independent Tax Dispute 
Resolution and Social Justice in Australia" (2012) 35 UNSWLJ 470 at 475.  
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taxpayers against the executive.226 This shift may mean that the court system affords the taxpayer 
even less protection from the state's whims, intensifying the controversy of decisions. In many other 
civil disputes, litigants have a wider range of dispute resolution available to them outside the court 
system, such as arbitration or mediation. The need for the court process to limit controversy and, in 
turn, be respected as an independent and reputable forum, is greater because tax litigants do not have 
the same choice of forum and degree of voluntariness towards litigation. 
Tax could also be described as a subject-matter with "high emotional content" because of the 
taking of property that it involves.227 Certainly, some regard taxation as an extraction of private wealth 
and a deeply intrusive power of the state. Judge Barber observes that the "harrowing" process prior to 
a case reaching court can add to the emotional content of tax cases, resulting in an "air of great tension 
and ill feeling between the parties" that strengthens the need for an undoubtedly independent 
adjudicator.228 Indeed, he recounts instances of taxpayers weeping inconsolably upon the realisation 
that they were finally "actually in an independent judicial forum".229 Most of the countries surveyed 
in Part IV have additional measures in place for the protection of taxpayers, such as a dedicated tax 
ombudsman in Australia or a "taxpayer bill of rights" in the United States.230 There is a risk that, 
absent these checks, a small tax court with a greater susceptibility to bias or corruption may corner 
taxpayers, leaving them with limited recourse.231 Even where appeal is available, appellate courts 
remain bound by the tax court's findings of facts, which may be of little consolation for litigants in 
fact-centric tax decisions.  
Tax avoidance scholarship has frequently engaged with questions of the morality of tax avoidance. 
With this degree of emotional content, a judge's particular persuasion on an issue is even more likely 
to enter into that judge's decision making, and may lead to the development of a bias. The exposure 
of many taxpayer companies to a great deal of moral and ethical scrutiny232 also means that the 
  
226  Ivor Richardson "Attitudes to Income Tax Avoidance" (inaugural address delivered before Victoria 
University of Wellington, 18 April 1967) at 16.  
227  Legomsky, above n 36, at 27. 
228  Riley and others, above n 60, at 475. 
229  At 475. 
230  See generally Adrian Sawyer "A Comparison of New Zealand Taxpayers' Rights with Selected Civil Law and 
Common Law Countries – Have New Zealand Taxpayers Been 'Short–Changed'?" (1999) 32 Vand J 
Transnat'l L 1345.  
231  The Government is looking to establish a conduct complaints process, which may help to boost the 
accountability of judicial officers in the Taxation Review Authority: Cabinet Social Policy Committee Paper, 
above n 50, at 6. 
232  Keating observes that allegations of tax avoidance carry a "significant reputational dimension": Keating, 
above n 150, at 133. 
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decisions are more likely to be highly controversial and have an emotional impact, heightening the 
need for public justice in the ordinary courts.  
However, the controversy of tax cases persists, even when the general courts decide them. Many 
commentators have labelled recent decisions, particularly in avoidance cases, as "controversial" and 
have been critical of the Commissioner's success rate.233 Coleman notes that the successful streak of 
appeals by taxpayers in the 1990s has now ended and has been replaced by a string of successes for 
the Commissioner, emboldening her to take "…a more and more aggressive stand in litigation".234 In 
a series of interviews with tax lawyers, accountants, academics and former IRD investigators, there 
was some evidence of a feeling that the generalist judiciary was increasingly likely to side with the 
Commissioner's position, with the results suggesting: "The participants felt that there had been a shift 
in judicial attitude when interpreting the general anti-avoidance provision. Further, this shift has 
swung the pendulum the way of the Commissioner."235  
Greater judicial specialisation may send a message to taxpayers that the judiciary takes these 
controversial matters seriously. Greater judicial specialisation could have an important symbolic value 
in respect of tax law, by establishing that the resolution of tax disputes has a special status in New 
Zealand. This may encourage greater investment in New Zealand as a business jurisdiction,236 as well 
as greater compliance. The opposite possibility exists; taking tax outside the mainstream court system 
might simply create a perception of tax matters' relegation and confine taxpayers to a court of lower 
standing, depending on the specialist court's strength and resourcing. 
Additionally, a differing perception of the status of a court may also influence the court's ability 
to recruit judges,237 as occurred in relation to Canada's former Board of Review. The Law 
Commission noted that in a submission signed off by the senior courts' Heads of Bench it was 
suggested that "in accepting a High Court warrant, a judge necessarily 'gives up' a career where that 
person will have some real standing, and in most cases a better financial return than that provided to 
the judiciary".  In light of that, recruitment may become even more difficult if candidates perceive 
specialist courts to be less prestigious.238  
  
233  Hamish Fletcher "Tax Ruling Alarming – Expert" The New Zealand Herald (online ed, Auckland, 6 March 
2013).    
234  James Coleman "Tax Update" [2014] NZLJ 43 at 43. 
235  Richard Bracefield and others "Perspectives and Implications of the Supreme Court ruling in Penny: Evidence 
of an Expectations Gap? (2013) 19 NZJTLP 51 at 56. 
236  The Law Commission acknowledged that "how things present themselves to the business sector is an 
important intangible element": Law Commission, above n 2, at 114. 
237  Markus Zimmer "Overview of Specialized Courts" (2009) 2 International Journal for Court Administration 
46 at 47. 
238  Law Commission, above n 2, at 103. 
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I Logistics: Volume, Time and Geographic Distribution 
Even though many of these criteria point towards specialisation, the logistics produce the most 
fatal objection. The Law Commission has acknowledged: "It would not be sensible for any jurisdiction 
to introduce change into a quality generalist jurisdiction unless the need to do so can be properly 
demonstrated." This need is not yet demonstrated. Much of the efficiency gain from a specialised 
judicial system relies on a steady stream of cases, which the small jurisdiction of New Zealand would 
fail to supply.239 Additionally, specialisation renders the court system less responsive to fluctuations 
in the volume of cases in particular areas. Glazebrook J dismissed the possibility of an independent 
tax court on logistical grounds:240 
In a jurisdiction as small as New Zealand … the creation of a separate court dealing with all tax cases is 
not really an option, particularly with the decline in tax cases being brought before the courts. Even in its 
heyday, the Taxation Review Authority could not support more than two judges. 
There are few empirical studies of the volume of tax litigation, but many commentators echo 
Glazebrook's J view that the number of tax cases is decreasing steadily. The Ministry of Justice's 
review of Wellington and Auckland High Court registries in 2010 put tax law at just 3.8 per cent of 
the total sample of cases.241 However, in the Bar Association's submissions they noted that "many of 
the countries that are actually embracing specialisation are relatively small, and that on the 
international experience size alone is not a significant inhibiting factor".242 This claim is not borne 
out by surveys of similarly sized countries; the few specialist tax courts or panels in countries of 
comparable size to New Zealand is compelling evidence of the unfeasibility of further 
specialisation.243  
As well as the number of tax disputes, the type of disputes is relevant to any proposals for 
specialisation. Glazebrook J observed an increasing trend towards procedural disputes between 1996 
and 2008 because of "teething difficulties" caused by procedures introduced in 1996.244 Substantive 
decisions heighten the benefits of specialisation because they are more likely to engage the judge's 
  
239  This was the conclusion of the Law Commission in Delivering Justice for All: A Vision for New Zealand 
Courts and Tribunals, above n 12, at 263: "Given the size of the New Zealand jurisdiction and the number of 
judges in the High Court, we do not believe that the system can have specialist judges to the exclusion of 
work in the broad general jurisdiction." 
240  Glazebrook, above n 86, at 21. 
241  Law Commission, above n 2, at 108–112. 
242  The New Zealand Bar Association "Submission to the Law Commission on the Review of the Judicature Act 
1908" as cited in Law Commission, above n 2, at 105. 
243  See Appendix 4. 
244  Susan Glazebrook "Taxation Disputes in New Zealand" (paper presented to Australasian Tax Teachers 
Association (ATTA) Conference, Auckland, January 2013) at 2. See also Young, above n 83, at 7–12. 
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specialist skill set and knowledge. The difference that judicial specialisation makes to the 
determination of procedural issues, judicial review decisions or enforcement decisions, is minimal. 
However, Glazebrook J suggests that the rise in procedural issues has settled, observing that in the 
2008–2013 period the number of procedural cases in the High Court had dropped to some five cases 
per year, compared to 14 procedural cases in the 2003–2008 period.245 The "most important tax cases" 
before the Supreme Court between its introduction in 2003 and 2013 have featured a more balanced 
ratio between procedural and substantive issues; of the 12 tax cases before the Supreme Court, five 
involved procedural issues and the remainder involved tax avoidance or evasion and goods and 
services tax.246 Brown suggests that a reduction of procedural cases is not so obvious, arguing that 
"relatively few of the cases involving Inland Revenue relate to substantive tax disputes (for example, 
disputes concerning the application of substantive taxing provisions)".247 
Most commentators seem to agree that, at least for the substantive cases, tax avoidance is a 
dominant issue. Keating looks broadly at IRD's attitude towards general anti-avoidance provisions, 
finding that between 2004 and 2010, the Department's investigators sought approval to invoke either 
the GAAR or the anti-avoidance rule in s 76 of the Goods and Services Tax Act 1985 804 times, with 
approval granted in 724 instances. Keating concludes that tax avoidance is a "major feature of the 
New Zealand tax landscape" that consumes a "disproportionate amount of the resources of Inland 
Revenue, taxpayers, the courts and practitioners".248 This has implication for the merits of 
specialisation. The controversy and discretion that are strongly associated with general anti-avoidance 
rules are heightened in these cases, militating against specialisation.  
Additionally, the "price" of administering a specialist court or panel is not simply figurative. A 
separate court "does not come cheap",249 and although a panel would better utilise existing facilities 
and court systems, it would still involve additional administrative and managerial costs that are 
unlikely to be offset by any efficiency gains. New Zealand's geographic dispersal would further 
complicate the logistics of specialisation. Legomsky notes: "A small pie is inconvenient enough, but 
having to carve it into even smaller segments exacerbates the problem."250 Adjudicating a small 
number of tax cases across New Zealand's major populations, presumably with a circuit system,251 
  
245  Glazebrook, above n 86, at 3. 
246  Susan Glazebrook "Taxation Disputes in New Zealand" (paper presented to Australasian Tax Teachers 
Association (ATTA) Conference, Auckland, January 2013) at 3.  
247  Brown, above n 91, at 4. 
248  Keating, above n 150, at 115–116. 
249  Law Commission, above n 14, at 70. 
250  Legomsky, above n 36, at 31. 
251  This would follow the practice of the Taxation Review Authority, which is based in Wellington, but travels 
in circuit around New Zealand: Prebble and Prebble, above n 85, at 248.  
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would be costly to administer and can lead to certain cities with backlogs of cases and others with an 
idle jurisdiction. 
Ultimately, the tax caseload is insufficient to justify further specialisation, and of the cases that 
do reach court, the procedural nature of many cases would not reap the full benefits of specialisation. 
Although these problems fall under a single criterion, the logistical problems associated with an 
inadequate caseload are fatal to the implementation of tax specialisation.   
J Unique Procedural Needs 
Tax law does not feature particularly unique procedural needs. Already, the TRA has relaxed rules 
of evidence that allow it to receive any documents or information that assist with the effective dealing 
of the inquiry.252 Judge Barber described the TRA as a "slightly relaxed forum" that is "supposed to 
be trying to put the taxpayer a little bit at ease".253 The procedural rules are also relaxed for cases that 
fall under pt 8 of the Tax Administration Act 1994 that the High Court hears.254 An advantage of the 
Authority's status as a tribunal is the room it has to develop fast-tracking or informal procedures in 
the future (as in Australia and Canada), which is a possibility that the ossified High Court Rules 
limit.255 
Typically, the taxpayers who take tax cases to court tend to be large companies represented by 
skilled and experienced advocates who are comfortable with formal court procedures. The high 
quality of advocacy in tax cases suggests that judges do not need to take a specialised and more active 
role in the exposition of a case.256  
K Special Need for Prompt Resolution 
A need for prompt resolution suggests that specialisation is desirable. Specialists are able to deal 
with cases more rapidly because less preparation and research around basic principles is necessary. 
  
252  Taxation Review Authorities Act 1994, s 17(1).  
253  Riley and others, above n 60, at 475. 
254 Tax Administration Act 1994, s 136(16). 
255  In Australia, the Federal Court has a fast–track system that aims to deliver judgments within six weeks of the 
trial. The fast–track system incorporates measures such as replacing full proceedings with a case summary, 
dealing with most interlocutory applications on the papers, holding scheduling conferences, reducing 
discovery, holding pre–trial conferences, and conducting "chess–clock" style trials: " Fast Track System" 
Federal Court of Australia <www.fedcourt.gov.au>. In Canada, taxpayers can opt to proceed with cases where 
the tax is less than $25,000 via the informal process. The informal process encompasses more relaxed and 
flexible rules of evidence and representation, and it guarantees that the court fixes a hearing date within 180 
days of the filing deadline for the reply and delivers judgments within 90 days of the hearing: MacGregor and 
others, above n 127, at 95–97. 
256  Even supposing that tax judges need to adopt a different role to cater to unique procedural needs, there is little 
to suggest that those who are experts in taxation will be any more capable of performing this role. 
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Judges with technical knowledge of an area are also better able to quickly identify the issues in a case, 
and have less need for expert witnesses.257 The expediency of case progression corresponds to the 
financial burden of running the courts, which is transferred to litigants paying hearing fees and to 
taxpayers funding the court system. Molloy argues that a further cost of an inefficient allocation of 
judicial time is that the system needs more judges, meaning additional judges must be appointed from 
a "lower strata" of candidates, in turn producing greater inefficiency and lower quality judgments.258 
There are many stages to a tax dispute, and most of them are unduly time-consuming, whether 
specialists adjudicate them or not. Tax law does not involve a peculiar need for prompt resolution; 
usually the taxpayer has the ability to defer disputed payments, which alleviates the hardship of a long 
wait for a decision.259 However, the time per case of tax disputes is still unsatisfactory. Sir Ivor 
Richardson expressed an overall concern that "resolving tax disputes can take an unacceptably long 
time" and referred to the many years that pass before cases reached the Court of Appeal.260 The 
disputes process has also been criticised for being time-consuming.261  
Again, the best way to address these delays is by reforming the process' existing form rather than 
adding a specialist court or panel system to the High Court. The High Court will benefit from insights 
into the facts provided by the TRA and the disputes process will help to narrow the range of issues 
even coming before the court. A specialist court may replace the Authority but it would be unlikely 
to deal with cases more efficiently than the already specialised tribunal and neither option would 
address the wait before a case reaches court, which is a significant contributor to the delays in 
resolving tax cases.  
VI THE BENCHMARK FOR SPECIALISATION 
Tax law should not operate in isolation to the greater court system. Nor should any proposals for 
specialisation be considered without a view to the overall integrity of the court structure. The Law 
Commission's call for a "coherent and principled framework for the court system" identifies the need 
to consider specialisation holistically, with a view to creating a system that will be robust and 
  
257  Katz observes that as well as the lesser need for expert witnesses to understand the complexities of the case, 
there is also likely to be less reliance on expert witness' conclusions, stating that "again it should not be 
overlooked that the skill of the specialist advocate can extend to the embellishment of a submission that might 
muster some credence before a generalist judge, but would readily be seen for what it is by a specialist judge: 
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(2012) 18 AULR 37 at 39. 
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259  Tax Administration Act 1994, s 128(2). 
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261  Andrew Maples "Resolving Small Tax Disputes in New Zealand – Is There A Better Way?" (2011) 6 JATTA 
96; James Peck and Andrew J Maples "The Tax Disputes Process in New Zealand: What about the Little 
Fellas?" (2010) 16 NZJTLP 348; Keating, above n 150; and Glazebrook, above n 86, at 15. 
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responsive to a changing legal environment in the future.262 There is arguably a more principled basis 
for the specialisation of tax cases than there has been for many existing specialist courts. However, 
the benchmark for greater specialisation cannot be measured against current specialist courts, when 
many of these courts lack a firm and consistent rationale. There is a risk that accepting the existing 
specialist courts as a justification for further specialisation in the court system would open the 
floodgates to specialist courts or divisions fragmenting the High Court, as has occurred in the case of 
tribunals. This risk will become even more pressing should the Judicature Modernisation Bill be 
passed, empowering the Chief High Court judge to create new High Court panels.  
Finding the appropriate benchmark for specialisation is not a matter of tallying Legomsky's 
criteria to establish whether there are more numeric benefits or disadvantages to specialisation. The 
criteria are not of equal weighting and some factors point more persuasively towards or away from 
greater specialisation. Finally, although it is helpful to consider the overseas experiences of 
specialisation, which can highlight certain frequent problems or benefits of specialisation, it is also 
inappropriate to rely heavily on the approaches taken in further jurisdictions as an indication of the 
correct level of specialisation. Specialisation is deeply contextual and the size and structure of New 
Zealand's court system does not provide a meaningful comparison on which to base the appropriate 
level of specialisation in New Zealand.   
Instead, the conclusion must be based on a balancing of all of these factors, including the existing 
level and success of tax specialisation in New Zealand, the impact of specialisation on the court system 
as a whole, the successes and shortfalls of specialisation overseas, and nuanced evaluation of 
Legomsky's criteria.  
VII CONCLUSION 
On the surface, these factors may appear to point towards specialisation. The nature of tax law 
establishes it as an obviously complex and dynamic area of law that stands to benefit from 
specialisation. Many commentators have pointed to issues with the Taxation Review Authority and 
the general court system, questioning the institutional proficiency of these organisations in dealing 
with tax cases effectively and efficiently. The introduction of greater judicial specialisation seems an 
obvious answer to these problems, and it has been a broadly successful response in the United States, 
Canada and Australia. Judicial specialisation at the High Court level, through an independent court or 
internal panel, appears to hold plain and logical benefits; from greater judicial expertise flows higher 
quality decisions and increased efficiency. In light of this, it is tempting to suggest that a specialist 
tax court or panel is warranted in New Zealand.   
However, a closer inspection reveals that greater specialisation is not without a price. Greater 
specialisation risks the development of idiosyncrasies in the development of the law, the 
  
262  Law Commission, above n 12, at 104. 
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fragmentation of the court system, and heightened controversy or perceptions of bias or appropriation 
by interest groups. This is not an abstract concern; criticisms of a lack of independence or 
appropriation are frequent across the overseas experience of specialisation and the history of judicial 
specialisation in New Zealand indicates a risk of specialist courts being used as a tool for policy 
intervention. Although the benefits of specialisation often vary in extent, the disadvantages associated 
with specialisation persist consistently across different applications of judicial specialisation and can 
be devastating to a court's perception. 
Not only does specialisation come at a "price", but the supposed payoff of specialisation is 
unlikely to be realised in New Zealand. As well as heightening the problems of a clannish and insular 
grouping of professionals, the logistical realities of a small country like New Zealand prohibit the 
replication of successful specialist courts and panels of foreign jurisdictions, and outweigh any 
arguments for the greater efficiency of specialist courts. New Zealand lacks the critical tax case 
volume that would enable judges to develop a specialisation, and numerous procedural cases coming 
before the courts often do not benefit from the enhanced expertise, efficiency and internal consistency 
of specialisation. New Zealand simply does not have the size (both the size of the judiciary and the 
wider legal system) or resources to support tax judicial specialisation.   
Additionally, New Zealand is further separated from other judiciaries with tax specialisation by 
the existence of effective extra-judicial means of tax specialisation, such as the comprehensive 
disputes process, which continues to evolve and develop to become more efficient and respected. The 
Taxation Review Authority continues to occupy an important position in New Zealand's court system, 
even though it has been affected by fluctuations in workload due to systemic and policy reforms of 
the tax system. Many of the issues faced by the tribunal and the disputes process revolve around how 
expensive and time-consuming these forums are. However, these issues are unlikely to be directly 
caused by problems associated with specialisation, but are more closely tied to the resourcing and 
management of these forums, which have been subject to a series of ongoing, promising reforms and 
enhancements since their fairly recent introduction. These reforms will also ensure that the critical 
perception of independence of the TRA is maintained. 
Countless arguments can be made for the advantages and disadvantages of judicial specialisation. 
Yet overseas experience, an appreciation for the New Zealand context of specialisation and an 
evaluation of the normative debate, suggest that many of the theoretical benefits of specialisation 
would not translate to a small New Zealand context, while the inefficiencies, appropriation or bias 
risk, clannishness and isolated development of the law, would mean that the price that New Zealand 
would pay for a specialised judicial society in respect of tax law would far outweigh the benefits that 
specialisation purports to offer.  
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VIII APPENDIX 1: NUMBER OF TAX REVIEW AUTHORITY 
CASES BY YEAR263 
Year # of Cases Year # of Cases 
1974 30 1994 38 
1975 24 1995 45 
1976 22 1996 59 
1977 11 1997 41 
1978 25 1998 25 
1979 24 1999 28 
1980 33 2000 21 
1981 40 2001 9 
1982 62 2002 14 
1983 71 2003 29 
1984 89 2004 30 
1985 87 2005 16 
1986 110 2006 10 
1987 100 2007 13 
1988 82 2008 13 
1989 108 2009 19 
1990 132 2010 11 
1991 71 2011 12 
1992 86 2012 11 
1993 59 2013 11 
 
  
  
263  Courts of New Zealand does not publish statistics relating to the case volumes of specific tribunals, such as 
the Taxation Review Authority, but only publishes general workload statistics for a collection of 24 select 
tribunals, including the Taxation Review Authority. These statistics are instead compiled from the cases 
reported in the New Zealand Tax Cases journal. 
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IX APPENDIX 2: TAXATION REVIEW AUTHORITY 
 APPOINTMENTS264 
Year Name Term Tenure  
(Years) 
Appointment or  
Re-Appointment 
Gazette Notice  
(Gazette Year/  
Page Reference) 
1981 Paul Barber 1981-1988 7 Appointment 1981/2371 
1982 John Bathgate 1982-1989 7 Appointment 1982/1383 
1984 David Sheppard 1984-1991 7 Appointment 1985/129 
1987 Patrick Keane 1987-1994 7 Appointment 1987/1233 
1988 Paul Barber 1988-1995 7 Re-Appointment 1988/3646 
1989 John Bathgate 1989-1996 7 Re-Appointment 1989/865 
1991 Antony Willy 1991-1998 7 Appointment 1991/3223 
1994 Patrick Keane 1994-2001 7 Re-Appointment 1994/1400 
2003 Paul Barber 2003-2006 3 Re-Appointment 2003/843 
2012 Allison Sinclair 2012-2017 5 Appointment 2012/66 
X APPENDIX 3: SITTING DAYS OF THE TAXATION REVIEW 
AUTHORITY265 
Year Sitting Days 
1997 72 
1998 73 
1999 103 
2000 50 
2001 21 
2002 26 
2003 96 
 
  
264  Between 2006 and 2012, Paul Barber continued to act as an Authority, but there does not appear to be a record 
of this reappointment in the Gazette. Additionally, Board of Review Judge AJ Lloyd Martin continued to act 
as an Authority once the Board became the Taxation Review Authority. 
265  These figures are taken from the Annual Reports of the Department of Courts in 2003 and 1999: Annual 
Report (Department for Courts, 1999) at 99; and Annual Report (Department for Courts, 2003) at 105. 
Following the merger of the Department of Courts and the Ministry of Justice in 2003, these statistics were 
no longer collected and published. The figures do not always accurately reflect the demand for the Authority 
because complex cases can skew the total sitting days. For instance, in 1995, a single case occupied an entire 
43 sitting days: Case R 25 (1994) 16 NZTC 6,120 (TRA). 
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XI APPENDIX 4: SPECIALISATION IN COUNTRIES OF 
SIMILAR SIZE 
Country Population  
(million)266 
Tax 
Specialisation  
(Court Level)? 
Tax 
Specialisation 
(Tribunal 
Level)? 
Other Notes 
New 
Zealand 
4.51 No Yes New Zealand's specialist 
tribunal is the Taxation 
Review Authority.267 
Ireland 4.63 No Yes A specialist, independent 
Appeal Commissioner 
hears appeals by 
taxpayers.268 
Lebanon 4.82 Yes Yes Although not solely a tax 
specialisation, Lebanon has 
administrative courts and 
tribunals that hear tax 
matters.269 
Norway 5.04 No No There is no tax judicial 
specialisation in Norway, 
either curial or 
adjudicative.270 
Singapore 5.41 No Yes Singapore has three Boards 
of Review for tax matters; 
the Goods & Services Tax 
Board of Review, the 
Income Tax Board of 
Review, and the Valuation 
Review Board.271 
  
266  Population Statistics are taken from the projections for 2013 in: United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs/Population Division World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision (New York, 2013) vol 1 
at 57. 
267  Taxation Review Authorities Act 1994. 
268 Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 (Ireland), s 850; "Office of the Appeal Commissioners (for the purposes of the 
Income Tax Acts)" (1999) Office of the Appeal Commissioners <www.appealcommissioners.ie>. 
269  OECD Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes: Peer Review Report 
Phase 1: Legal and Regulatory Framework: Lebanon (OECD Publishing, 2012) at 11–12. 
270  Bård Tønder "The Control of the Legislative and the Executive Power by Norwegian Courts" (24 June 2014) 
The Supreme Court of Norway <www.domstol.no>. 
271  Singapore Income Tax Act (c 134) 2014, s 78; Income Tax (Board of Review) (Appeals Procedure) 
Regulations 1990; Goods and Services Tax Act (c 117a), s 50(10); Goods and Services Tax (Board of Review) 
Regulations 1993; Property Tax Act (c 254), s 68; and Valuation Review Board (Appeals Procedure) 
Regulations 1990. 
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Country Population  
(million)266 
Tax 
Specialisation  
(Court Level)? 
Tax 
Specialisation 
(Tribunal 
Level)? 
Other Notes 
Finland  5.43 Yes Yes Finland has a Board of 
Adjustment as the first 
appeal authority and then 
further appeals may go to 
the Administrative 
Court.272 
Slovakia 5.45 Yes No Slovakia has an 
administrative law section 
within its regional courts 
that usually act as the court 
of first instance in 
administrative matters.273 
Denmark 5.62 No Yes The Danish National Tax 
Tribunal hears tax matters. 
The taxpayer may also 
request an expert opinion at 
several stages of the 
dispute, including at the 
City Court/High Court 
stage.274 
  
272  "Tax Administration and Appeals" Vero: Finnish Tax Administration <www.vero.fi>. 
273  OECD, above n 269, at 14. 
274  OECD, above n 269, at 61. 
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XII APPENDIX 5: CASES IN THE TAXATION REVIEW 
AUTHORITY, HIGH COURT, COURT OF APPEAL AND 
SUPREME COURT275 
Year TRA High Court Court of Appeal Supreme Court 
2008 13 64 9 4 
2009 19 60 17 5 
2010 11 65 11 6 
2011 12 57 12 5 
2012 11 56 8 7 
2013 11 63 15 2 
 
 
  
275  Courts of New Zealand, the Ministry of Justice and the IRD do not collect/publish statistics for the volume of 
tax cases before the courts or the Taxation Review Authority. Data relating to the Taxation Review Authority 
is compiled from the cases reported in the New Zealand Tax Cases journal. Data relating to the general courts 
is compiled from the Ministry of Justice's Judicial Decisions Online Database where cases have the 
Commissioner as a party. As a result, these statistics may also include cases that relate to ACC, liquidations 
or child support, for instance. 
